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DERIVATIVES CLEARINGHOUSES: CLEARING 
THE WAY TO FAILURE 
HESTER PEIRCE 
ABSTRACT 
One of the major components of Dodd-Frank was a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for over-the-counter derivatives. A key feature of this framework is a 
requirement that many of these derivatives be cleared through central counterparty 
clearinghouses. Clearinghouses have long played a stabilizing force in many 
markets, but Dodd-Frank’s regulatory mandate may adversely affect the way they 
operate. Risk management by clearinghouses and market participants could suffer, 
and improper risks could find their way into clearinghouses. If a clearinghouse were 
to fail, there would be tremendous pressure for the government to bail it out in the 
name of financial stability. Dodd-Frank’s derivatives framework should be 
reconsidered before it destabilizes the financial system. A better approach would 
empower market participants to decide whether to use clearinghouses and would 
allow clearinghouses the regulatory latitude to effectively manage their risks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The remaking of the United States derivatives markets is among the most 
celebrated pieces of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).1 The Dodd-Frank reform, however, has unnecessarily 
destabilized the financial markets through mandatory reliance on central 
counterparties (“CCPs”), which are financial institutions that collect derivatives 
transactions from many market participants and manage the associated risks. A 
better approach would be to abandon the central clearing mandate and the associated 
trading mandate and allow the derivatives markets to develop through market—not 
regulatory—mechanisms. Combined with principles-based regulation for CCPs and 
robust regulatory reporting, an organically developed market structure would enable 
the derivatives markets to mitigate risk—including through the voluntary use of 
CCPs—without undermining financial stability. 
Derivatives are financial contracts that derive their value from the price of 
something else, such as a commodity, stock, bond, index, or currency. These 
contracts—which include futures, forwards, swaps, and options—enable companies 
and individuals to shift risks to parties willing to bear that risk. Financial and non-
financial companies use derivatives to manage a wide array of risks, including 
foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, and counterparty risk. 
Many derivatives trade on exchanges and are cleared through CCPs, which are 
often affiliated with the exchange.2 These derivatives adhere to a standard set of 
terms governing each aspect of the contract. Derivatives also can be executed off-
exchange in a bilateral transaction between a dealer (usually a large bank)3 and 
another dealer or customer. These bilateral transactions afford substantial flexibility 
in contract terms to accommodate the unique needs of the customer. Accordingly, 
risks that are particular to the specific transactions or to a specific company are 
typically managed through bilateral transactions and are not cleared through CCPs. 
Reform advocates often cite uncleared, over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives 
(also referred to as “swaps” in this article) as a core cause of the crisis and posit 
mandatory central clearing as a key solution.4 Their theory is that large banks and 
                                                           
 1  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 22, 
26, 28, 31 & 42 U.S.C.). 
 2  In the United States futures markets, exchanges typically are vertically integrated with 
clearinghouses, whereas clearinghouses in the equities and options markets are independent of 
exchanges. See Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of Regulation of Clearing in 
the Securities and Futures Markets and Its Impact on Competition, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 313, 346-47 (2010) (discussing why these markets developed differently). 
 3  The United States derivatives market is concentrated; four commercial banks—
JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, and Goldman Sachs—have approximately 
ninety percent of the banking industry’s derivatives. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES 
THIRD QUARTER 16, 17 (2015), http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/trading/derivatives/dq315.pdf [hereinafter OCC QUARTERLY REPORT]. 
 4  When discussing derivatives, Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew remarked that:  
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other large financial firms were dangerously bound together through a non-
transparent web of derivatives exposures. Dodd-Frank proffered mandatory central 
clearing, which substitutes a central clearinghouse for the bilateral relationship 
between the parties to an OTC transaction, as the best way to bring order to the 
chaos of the large OTC derivative markets. To complement central clearing, Dodd-
Frank imposes trading and reporting mandates with the goal of making the OTC 
markets more transparent and competitive.5 
This Article argues that the combination of clearing mandates, government 
prescriptions regarding clearinghouse design, and government support for CCPs 
threatens financial stability. As Professor Craig Pirrong warned, “a wholesale re-
engineering of the structure of derivatives markets via legislative fiat is fraught with 
danger.”6 A preferable approach would eliminate government backstops and leave 
                                                           
During 2008, when Lehman Brothers went under and AIG nearly collapsed, the 
complex web of bilateral derivatives contracts was a critical driver of the financial 
meltdown. But there was no statutory authority to set standards for this market. Wall 
Street Reform changed that . . . . Opaque bilateral trading is being replaced by central 
clearing and transparent trading. And all trades must be reported.  
Jacob L. Lew, Secretary, Dept’t of Treasury, Remarks at the Brookings Institution (July 8, 
2015), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/Remarks-by-Treasury-
Secretary-Jacob-J.-Lew-at-The-Brookings-Institution.aspx. Chairman Gary Gensler, also in 
support of OTC derivatives, stated that:  
A key measure included in the financial reform bill currently being debated in the 
Senate would require standard over-the-counter derivatives to be cleared by central 
clearinghouses. This will greatly reduce risk, interconnectedness and the need for 
future bailouts. Financial institutions would be freer to fail with limited effects on the 
broader economy. 
Gary Gensler, Clearinghouses Are the Answer, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704671904575194463642611160.  
 5  See, e.g., A Transformed Marketplace – Remarks of Chairman Gary Gensler’s Before the 
FIA 2013 Futures & Options Expo, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (Nov. 6, 
2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-151 (“Now, as a result of 
reforms, swap execution facilities (SEFs) are required to provide all market participants with 
impartial access. They must provide dealers and non-dealers alike the ability to make and respond 
to bids, offers and requests for quotes. This is a basic tenant [sic] that Adam Smith and so many 
economists have laid out – that access and transparency promote competition and benefit the 
economy.”); Ilya Beylin, A Reassessment of the Clearing Mandate: How the Clearing Mandate 
Affects Swap Trading Behavior and the Consequences for Systemic Risk 51-52 (Oct. 20, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2613779_ 
code701120.pdf?abstractid=2612755&mirid=1 (discussing the potential for the combination of 
trading and clearing mandates to diminish dealers’ hold on the swaps market). The trading mandate 
is falling short of this goal due to implementation problems. See, e.g., Statement from 
Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo Reconsidering the CFTC’s Swap Trading Rules for 
Greater Effectiveness in the Global Economy, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
(Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/giancarlostatement111214 
(“The CFTC’s flawed SEF framework is causing a range of unintended adverse consequences. For 
one, it is ensuring that big platforms get bigger and small platforms get squeezed out because of the 
sharply increased legal and compliance costs of registering and operating a SEF.”). 
 6  CRAIG PIRRONG, THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE CLEARING MANDATE, POLICY ANALYSIS 33 
(2010), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA665.pdf [hereinafter PIRRONG, 
INEFFICIENCY]. 
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decisions about which products should be centrally cleared and how CCPs should 
operate to private decision-makers. The current regulatory framework would be 
replaced by a principles-based regulatory approach and mandatory reporting of 
swaps transactions. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes OTC derivatives and 
clearinghouses and how they are regulated under Dodd-Frank. Part II describes why 
this framework is problematic. Part III posits an alternate framework.  
I. OTC DERIVATIVES, CLEARINGHOUSES, AND THEIR NEW REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
Derivative contracts include a wide array of financial instruments subject to 
different regulatory regimes. The uniting theme is that a derivative is a “contract 
between two parties providing for a payoff from one party to the other determined by 
the price of an asset, an exchange rate, a commodity price, or an interest rate.”7 The 
financial instruments on which derivatives are based include currencies, interest 
rates, commodities, and debt and equity securities. Derivatives contracts typically do 
not call for immediate performance; these contracts can last for weeks, months, or 
even years. Options, futures, forwards, and swaps are types of derivatives.8 Of 
particular interest after the financial crisis, credit default swaps (“CDS”), protect 
buyers from negative credit events such as corporate or sovereign bond defaults.9 
American International Group’s (“AIG”) notorious crisis-era CDS transactions10 
                                                           
 7  DON M. CHANCE & ROBERT BROOKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT 625 (7th ed. 2004); see also Viral V. Acharya et al., Derivatives: The Ultimate 
Financial Innovation, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 233 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) (“Derivatives 
are financial contracts whose value is derived from some underlying asset. These assets can 
include equities and equity indices, bonds, loans, interest rates, exchange rates, commodities, 
residential and commercial mortgages, and even catastrophes like earthquakes and 
hurricanes.”); JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (7th ed. 2009) (“A 
derivative can be defined as a financial instrument whose value depends on (or derives from) 
the value of other, more basic, underlying variables.”); BRUCE TUCKMAN, IN DEFENSE OF 
DERIVATIVES: FROM BEER TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, POLICY ANALYSIS 2 (2015) (“A derivative 
is a contract between two parties that [c]ommits to exchange cash, goods, or securities in the 
future; [r]equires little or nothing in the way of an up-front payment; and [i]s written in a legal 
form that allows for swift remedial action in the event of a default—that is, without the 
approval of a bankruptcy court.”). 
 8  See Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS & 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#10 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016). 
 9  More precisely, a “credit default swap is a credit derivative contract in which one party 
(protection buyer) pays [a] periodic fee to another party (protection seller) in return for 
compensation for default (or similar credit event) by a reference entity.” Id. CDS received 
negative attention because some financial institutions engaged in these transactions without 
adequate risk controls and positive attention because CDS provided useful information to 
regulators and market participants trying to assess particular financial institutions’ well-being 
during the turbulent time of 2007 through 2009. 
 10  Although the narrative about AIG’s troubled CDS business drove much of the push for 
central clearing, contrary to the popular narrative, there were significant non-derivatives 
contributors to AIG’s crisis. See, e.g., Hester Peirce, Securities Lending and the Untold Story 
in the Collapse of AIG (Mercatus Center, George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-12, 
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obscure the valuable informational role other CDS played during the crisis.11 In any 
case, as the following chart shows, CDS make up only a small subset of OTC 
derivatives. 
 
Figure 112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Derivatives are popular with financial and non-financial companies and with 
certain individuals. Nearly all large companies use derivatives to protect themselves 
from risks such as changes in commodity prices, interest rates, and foreign exchange 
rates.13 A key use of derivatives is to transfer risk from someone who does not want 
it to someone who is better able and more willing to bear the risk. Another important 
role derivatives play is price discovery and liquidity: Derivatives provide 
                                                           
May 2014), http://mercatus.org/publication/securities-lending-and-untold-story-collapse-aig 
(explaining the role that securities lending played in AIG’s crisis). 
 11  Acharya et al., supra note 7, at 239 (“[D]uring the current crisis, CDSs and other credit 
derivatives have played a very important role in disseminating information to both the public 
and to regulators. Due to the complexity of financial firms’ capital structures, it is difficult to 
infer general credit quality from the secondary market in underlying bonds, especially given 
that some of the bonds rarely trade. In contrast, from very early on during the financial crisis, 
the CDS market has judged the quality of financial firm’s bankruptcy prospects in a 
remarkably prescient way.”). 
 12  Detailed Tables on Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-December 2014, 
BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.bis.org/statistics/derdetailed.htm. 
 13  See, e.g., News Release, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Over 94% of 
the World’s Largest Companies Use Derivatives to Help manage their Risks, According to 
ISDA Survey (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.isda.org/press/press042309der.pdf; see also 
TUCKMAN, supra note 7; Edmund Parker & Geoffrey Parker, A History of Derivatives: 
Ancient Mesopotamia to Trading Places, YOUTUBE (Dec. 17, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kd2pE5s33Qg (explaining the long history of derivatives). 
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information about the products or financial instruments on which they are based and 
can improve liquidity in the markets for those products or financial instruments.14 
A. OTC Derivatives in a Changing Regulatory Landscape 
OTC derivatives are widely used risk management tools because they can be 
designed to precisely match a specific risk. By one measure, OTC derivatives were a 
$600 trillion market in 2008.15 Thus, OTC derivatives understandably caught the 
attention of post-crisis policymakers. More than seventy-five percent of OTC 
derivatives are interest rate derivatives, just over sixteen percent are foreign 
exchange derivatives, and approximately four percent are credit derivatives.16 OTC 
derivatives are also often called swaps “because many OTC deals involve cash 
flows, or obligations, that are swapped or exchanged between two parties at defined 
intervals.”17 Before Dodd-Frank, OTC derivatives generally were bilaterally 
executed and not centrally cleared. Clients interacted with dealers—usually big 
banks—and these dealers entered into contracts with one another to shift risks 
among themselves. This structure, pictured below, enabled firms to trade discreetly 
and hedge their risks precisely, which brought risk management benefits and 
favorable accounting treatment.18 Rapid innovation was possible in the OTC markets 
as new products were designed in response to client needs and could be tested on a 
small-scale. 
 
  
                                                           
 14  Acharya et al., supra note 7, at 234. 
 15  $600 trillion is an attention-catching number, but some contend that representing the 
size of the market by reference to the notional value is potentially misleading. See, e.g., Jon 
Skinner, How Big is OTC Really?, OTC SPACE (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.theotcspace.com/2013/03/22/how-big-is-otc-really. Others point out the lack of a 
direct link between the notional value of the market and its risk to the financial system. See, 
e.g., Miguel A. Segoviano & Manmohan Singh, Counterparty Risk in the Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives Market 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 08/258, Nov. 2008), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08258.pdf (“Notional amounts are defined 
as the gross nominal value of all OTC derivative deals concluded and not yet settled on the 
reporting date. These amounts provide a measure of the size of the market, but do not provide 
a measure of risk.”). 
 16  OCC QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 3, at 10 (“Interest rate contracts continue to 
represent the lion’s share of the derivatives market at 76.9% of total derivatives. FX and credit 
derivatives are 16.7% and 4.3% of total notionals, respectively. Commodity and equity 
derivatives collectively are only 2.1% of total notional derivatives.”). 
 17  Richard Heckinger et al., Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, in UNDERSTANDING 
DERIVATIVES—MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 27 (2014). 
 18  Id. at 27-29 (discussing the reasons for using the OTC derivatives markets). 
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Dealer 2 
Client B 
Dealer 3 
Dealer 1 
Client A Client C 
Client G Client H Client I Client D Client E Client F 
Bilateral Market
Figure 219 
As a consequence of the dispersed, less standardized nature of the transactions, 
regulators had less comprehensive insight into swaps markets than, for example, into 
the futures market. Moreover, to provide legal clarity for the developing swaps 
markets,20 in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”) 
Congress deliberately exempted these over-the-counter transactions from most of the 
requirements of the Commodity Exchange Act and securities laws.21 In so doing, the 
CFMA provided legal certainty for these transactions, but exempted them from most 
regulatory requirements applicable to futures contracts and securities.22 These 
statutory exemptions, like the complex patchwork of prior regulatory exemptions on 
which they were built, also provided incentives not to standardize or clear swaps 
contracts.23  
                                                           
 19  Author’s Rendering 
 20  See id. at 35-38 (providing a helpful chronology of OTC derivative regulation). 
 21  Swaps between eligible contract participants that were individually negotiated and not 
executed on a trading facility were generally excluded from most provisions of the 
Commodity Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2(g) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). The justification for the exclusion was:  
[R]egulation of such transactions under the [Commodity Exchange Act] was 
unnecessary to achieve the act’s principal objectives of deterring market manipulation 
and protecting investors. Such transactions are not readily susceptible to manipulation 
and eligible counterparties can and should be expected to protect themselves against 
fraud and counterparty credit losses. Exclusion of these transactions resolved long-
standing concerns that a court might find that the CEA applied to these transactions, 
thereby making them legally unenforceable. 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Patrick Parkinson, Deputy 
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Although many observers blame the CFMA for creating a “regulatory black 
hole,”24 there were other regulatory and market constraints in place. First, certain 
antifraud laws continued to apply.25 Second, the participants in the OTC markets had 
to meet threshold criteria designed to ensure these markets were open only to 
sophisticated, institutional participants.26 Third, because large banks were and are 
active OTC dealers,27 bank regulators monitored much of the market activity.28 
Fourth, privately developed standards, including master agreements and other 
standardized contract documentation developed by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”), governed key aspects of relationships between 
swap dealers and their customers.29 Fifth, firms had taken steps to consolidate and 
                                                           
Dir., Div. of Research & Statistics), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/ 
2005/20050908/default.htm. 
 22  For a detailed analysis of the CFMA, see Memorandum from Cravath, Swain & Moore 
to ISDA Members, Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (Jan. 5, 2001), 
http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/analysis_of_commodity-exchange-act-legislation.pdf. 
 23  See, e.g., The Effective Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 164 (June 9, 2009) 
(statement of Christian Johnson, Professor, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, Univ. of Utah) (“Until 
recently, the U.S. regulatory structure effectively prevented clearing OTC derivatives” and 
“even the [CFMA] left regulatory barriers to clearing OTC derivatives.”). 
 24  Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the SEC’s Roundtable 
on Modernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Disclosure System (Oct. 8, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch100808cc.htm; see also BETTER MKTS, THE COST 
OF THE CRISIS: $20 TRILLION AND COUNTING (2015), http://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/ 
default/files/Better%20Markets%20-%20Cost%20of%20the%20Crisis.pdf (“[I]n 2000, 
Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act at the urging of financial industry 
lobbyists, which effectively prohibited the regulation of derivatives. This statute tied 
regulators’ hands and prevented them from engaging in any meaningful oversight, regulation, 
or enforcement in the swaps derivatives markets.”). 
 25  See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2) (2008), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010); Derivatives, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-
frank/derivatives.shtml (last modified May 5, 2015) (“The CFMA explicitly prohibited the 
SEC and CFTC from regulating the over-the-counter (OTC) swaps markets, but provided the 
SEC with antifraud authority over ‘security-based swap agreements,’ such as credit default 
swaps.”). 
 26  Under the CFMA, the OTC market was limited to “eligible contract participants,” 
which were generally financial institutions and nonfinancial entities meeting certain asset 
thresholds. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12)(2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 27  See supra note 3. 
 28  See, e.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 2 (1997) (“This guidance is intended to provide a 
framework for evaluating the adequacy of risk management practices of derivative dealers and 
end-users.”). 
 29  See, e.g., Christopher L. Culp, OTC-Cleared Derivatives: Benefits, Costs, and 
Implications of the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” 20 J. 
APPLIED FIN., 103, 108 (2010) (“[T]he use of master agreements provides contract language 
that is generally accepted amongst OTC derivatives participants. The most popular such 
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bring order to their derivatives positions through multilateral compression and the 
tearing up of redundant contracts.30 Sixth, parties in these OTC transactions had 
reason to choose their counterparties carefully and thereafter to monitor their 
creditworthiness because, unless there was a subsequent overriding transaction, these 
parties would remain in relationship with one another for the duration of the 
contract. Finally, starting before the crisis, policymakers were working with market 
participants on fortifying some of these market mechanisms for regulating 
derivatives markets.31 
After the crisis, there was an international effort to impose a new, more formal 
regulatory structure on the OTC derivatives markets. The Group of Twenty (G-20) 
nations, meeting after the crisis, made “[i]mproving over-the-counter derivatives 
markets” a key element of their post-crisis regulatory reform plans: 
All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges 
or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through 
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts 
should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts 
should be subject to higher capital requirements.32 
                                                           
master agreements are the ISDA Master Agreements.”); Stephen H. Moller et al., Section 
2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement and Emerging Swaps Jurisprudence in the Shadow of 
Lehman Brothers, 7 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 313, 314 (2011) (“For over 20 years, over-
the-counter swaps and other derivative contracts have been documented using the provisions 
prescribed by the forms of standard terms documents and master agreements and the related 
transaction architecture, all of which have been designed by ISDA.”); Frank Partnoy, Second-
Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169, 185-88 (2007) (discussing role of ISDA 
as standard setter in OTC derivatives markets). 
 30  See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MEETING 
NEW CHALLENGES TO STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM 93 (2010) [hereinafter IMF, 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT] (discussing pre-Dodd-Frank multilateral compression 
and tear-up operations). 
 31  See, e.g., OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2016) (“The OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group (ODSG) originated in 2005, when 
the New York Fed hosted a meeting with representatives of major over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives market participants and their domestic and international supervisors, in order to 
address the emerging risks of inadequate infrastructure for the rapidly growing market in 
credit derivatives. The group is chaired by the New York Fed and meets annually with other 
supervisors and signatories to a series of ‘commitment letters’. Commitments made by 
signatories signify their collective agreement to work with other signatories and their 
counterparties (whether signatories or not) to deliver structural improvements to the OTC 
derivatives market across asset classes in the interest of financial stability.”); The Effective 
Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, supra note 23, at 164 (noting “the 
good work that is being done in the credit default swap market as the regulators have nudged 
participants to clean up the area and to try and reduce systemic risk”). 
 32  Leaders’ Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit, DEP’T TREASURY (Sept. 24-25, 2009), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_  
leaders_statement_250909.pdf. 
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The agreed-upon “improvements” represented an ambitious plan to remake a 
massive market. The G20 agreement became the basis for ongoing reform efforts in 
the United States, European Union, and Asia.  
In the United States, the G-20 commitments took shape in Title VII of Dodd-
Frank. This section, spanning more than 150 pages, introduced a complex new 
regulatory structure for the OTC derivatives markets and participants in those 
markets. Title VII buckets OTC derivatives into two main categories; swaps 
regulated primarily by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and 
security-based swaps regulated primarily by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”).33 Most of the affected OTC derivatives are within the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction.34 The new framework requires active market participants to register and 
standardized OTC derivatives to be cleared, traded on an exchange or exchange-like 
platform, reported to data repositories, and publicly reported. Implementation of 
these interlinking pieces is a multi-year process with rolling deadlines for 
registration, reporting, clearing, and trading, depending on the type of OTC 
derivative and the type of market participant involved. Proponents look to the new 
swaps framework to enhance financial stability, reduce complexity, increase 
transparency, and foster competition. 
The CFTC and SEC share most of the responsibility for writing Dodd-Frank’s 
implementing rules. The two agencies are writing parallel, and sometimes 
inconsistent,35 sets of rules governing the markets and market participants. Bank 
regulators, as primary regulators for many market participants, also play a role, 
including with respect to the important issues of setting margin and capital 
                                                           
 33  The agencies share jurisdiction for a third category—“mixed swaps.” For simplicity 
and because the vast majority of OTC derivatives covered by Title VII fall under CFTC 
oversight, in this Article, the term “swap” is generally used interchangeably with “OTC 
derivative” and includes both swaps and security-based swaps. Dodd-Frank broadly defined 
“swaps” and “security-based swaps,” but directed the CFTC and SEC to define these terms 
more precisely. 15 U.S.C. § 8302(d) (2012). Regulators deferred this task until after many of 
the other Dodd-Frank rules were written, thus complicating efforts to understand how other 
rules would work.  
 34  See, e.g., GIBSON DUNN, U.S. SEC IMPLEMENTS DODD-FRANK ACT TITLE VII: REPORTING 
AND PUBLIC DISSEMINATION RULES FOR SECURITY-BASED SWAPS 1 (2015), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/SEC-Implements-Dodd-Frank-Title-VII--
Reporting-and-Public-%20Dissemination-Rules--Security-Based-Swaps.pdf (“Under the Dodd-
Frank Act, the CFTC has jurisdiction over foreign exchange, interest rate, and other commodity 
derivatives, as well as credit default and equity derivatives based on indices, two or more loans, and 
a broad-based (10 or more) group of securities. The SEC’s jurisdiction is limited to credit default 
and equity derivatives based on a single security or loan or a narrow-based (9 or fewer) group or 
index of securities (including any interest therein or the value thereof), or events relating to a single 
issuer or issuers of securities in a narrow-based security index.”). 
 35  See, e.g., id. at 17 (“Though Final Regulation SBSR provides a mechanism for 
substituted compliance, the lack of harmonization between the CFTC and SEC rules, as well 
as the rules of foreign jurisdictions, will only increase the complexity of the global reporting 
landscape.”). 
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requirements.36 Domestic regulations operate alongside, and sometimes in conflict 
with, the international rules adopted under the G-20 principles.37 
The Dodd-Frank Act swaps framework includes several key features. First, it 
identifies the major market participants—“swap dealers” and “major swap 
participants,”38  requires them to register with the CFTC or SEC,39 and subjects them 
to certain business conduct requirements.40 Second, Dodd-Frank requires the CFTC 
and SEC to identify OTC derivatives or categories that are subject to a clearing 
mandate.41 In making these determinations, the agencies must consider factors such 
as the size of the market, its liquidity, the availability of pricing data, the adequacy 
of the infrastructure supporting the swap, systemic risk considerations, competitive 
considerations, and legal certainty.42 Third, Dodd-Frank mandates these swaps—
except for those involving nonfinancial companies hedging their business risks—are 
                                                           
 36  See, e.g., Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 Fed. Reg. 
74839 (Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 45, 237, 349, 624 & 1221). 
 37  See FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORMS: NINTH PROGRESS 
REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION (2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/OTC-
Derivatives-Ninth-July-2015-Progress-Report.pdf. Both the SEC and CFTC have attempted to 
define the extraterritorial reach of their rules. See, e.g., Interpretive Guidance and Policy 
Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292 (July 
26, 2013); Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major-Security-Based Swap 
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 47278 
(Aug. 12, 2014); Application of Certain Title VII Requirements to Security-Based Swap 
Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, 
Negotiated, or Executed By Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch 
or Office of an Agent, 80 Fed. Reg. 27443 (May 13, 2015).  
 38  Dodd-Frank defines “swap dealers” and “major swap participants.” Dodd-Frank Act § 
721 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a (2012)). A parallel provision defines “security-based swap 
dealer” and “major security-based swap participant.” Id. at § 761 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a) (2012)). Dodd-Frank directs the CFTC and SEC to further define all of those terms and 
“swap,” “security-based swap,” “eligible contract participant,” and “security-based swap 
agreement.” id. § 712(d)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (2012)). These definitions are 
important as they help to determine which transactions are subject to Dodd-Frank 
requirements. 
 39  Id. § 731 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(a) (2012)) (providing for registration of swap 
dealers and major swap participants); id. § 764 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10 (2012)) 
(providing for registration of security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap 
participants). 
 40  Id. § 731 (adding 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)) (imposing business conduct requirements on swap 
dealers and major swap participants ); id. § 764 (adding 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(h)(3)) (imposing 
business conduct requirements on security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap 
participants). 
 41  Id. § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2) (2012)) (directing the CFTC to determine 
“on an ongoing basis” which swaps must be cleared); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78c-3(b) (2012)) (directing the SEC to determine “on an ongoing basis” which security-based 
swaps must be cleared). 
 42  Id. § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2) (2012)) (setting forth clearing determination 
factors for the CFTC); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b) (2012)) (setting forth 
clearing determination factors for the SEC). 
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cleared at clearinghouses registered with the SEC or CFTC.43 Fourth, if a trading 
venue is available, cleared swaps must trade on an exchange or a swap execution 
facility (“SEF”)—a new type of trading venue created by Dodd-Frank for the swaps 
markets.44 Fifth, Dodd-Frank rules prescribe how, when, and by whom cleared and 
uncleared swap transactions must be reported to a swap data repository, another new 
entity created under Dodd-Frank to house swap transaction data.45 Sixth, Dodd-
Frank requires public transparency about swap transactions.46 Finally, Title VII 
requires regulators to set capital and margin requirements in connection with cleared 
and uncleared swaps.47 In bilateral transactions, collateral arrangements have been 
flexible; for example, dealers and certain ostensibly “safe” clients did not have to 
post collateral48 and dealers sometimes accepted illiquid assets as collateral.49 
Therefore, the Title VII requirements mandating margin for uncleared transactions 
are a meaningful change. The impact is likely to be particularly significant because 
the statute directs regulators to set the capital and margin requirements for uncleared 
swaps with the key objective of “offset[ing] the greater risk to the swap dealer or 
major swap participant and the financial system arising from the use of swaps that 
                                                           
 43  Id. § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012)) (establishing swaps clearing 
requirement); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3) (2012) (establishing security-based 
swap clearing requirement). 
 44  Id. § 733 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7b-3 (2012)) (establishing swap execution facilities); 
id. § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(8) (2012)) (requiring trade execution for swaps); id. § 
763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(h) (2012) (requiring trade execution for security-based 
swaps made available to trade); id. § 763(c) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-4) (2012)) 
(establishing security-based swap execution facilities).  
 45  Id. §§ 727 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012)) (providing for swap data repository 
registration and requiring that all swaps be reported to a registered repository); id. § 729 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6r (2012)) (requiring reporting for uncleared swaps); id. § 763(i) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(m), (n) (2012)) (providing for security-based swap data repository 
registration and requiring that all security-based swaps be reported to a registered repository); 
id. § 766 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m-1 (2012)) (requiring reporting for uncleared security-
based swaps). 
 46  Id. § 727 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012)) (requiring public reporting of swap 
transaction data); id. § 763(i) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2012)) (requiring public 
reporting of security-based swap transaction data). 
 47  Id. § 731 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e) (2012)) (providing for capital and margin 
requirements for swaps); id. § 764 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(e) (2012)) (providing for 
capital and margin requirements for security-based swaps). 
 48  See, e.g., Manmohan Singh, Collateral, Netting and Systemic Risk in the OTC 
Derivatives Market 5-6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 10/99, 2010), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=23741.0. 
 49  See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case 
Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 649 (2010) (observing that in 
certain bilateral transactions with end-users, dealers may “take unsecured risk . . . or may 
accept illiquid collateral, for example, business assets, to secure potential counterparty 
exposure.”). 
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are not cleared.”50 This requirement hints at the value Dodd-Frank’s drafters placed 
on central clearing—the subject of the next section of this Article. 
B. What Clearinghouses Do 
Mandated central clearing is a key aspect of the G-20 reform plan and, of the 
Dodd-Frank reform plan for derivatives. Policymakers, shaken by the large bilateral 
derivatives exposures that came into focus during the crisis, sought to take risk out 
of individual firms and house it in solidly managed and well-regulated 
clearinghouses.51 Proponents of central clearing argue this arrangement reduces 
systemic risk by limiting big financial institutions’ exposures to one another and 
replacing them with exposures to safe CCPs.52 Advocates also point to the value of 
central clearing in enhancing transparency, introducing margin uniformity and 
discipline, mutualizing losses, and limiting the need for market participants to 
monitor one another.53 If a member defaults, a properly functioning CCP can move 
clients of the defaulting firm to new counterparties with relative ease. Moreover, as 
one observer has noted, CCPs serve a valuable role in speeding payments to a subset 
of a failed clearing member’s creditors without slowing payments to others.54 
Clearinghouses have existed for centuries in different contexts. In essence, as Ed 
Nosal of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago explains, clearing is “a set of 
                                                           
 50  Dodd-Frank Act § 731(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e)(3)(A) (2012)); see also id. § 764(a) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(e)(3)(A) (2012)) (comparable provision for security-based 
swaps). Former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner explained the rationale for stringent 
uncleared margin requirements: 
Imposing appropriate margin requirements on uncleared swaps will also help create 
incentives for market participants to use centralized clearing and standardized 
contracts so that they do not needlessly externalize risks to the financial system by 
avoiding central clearing. New margin requirements will also mitigate the increased 
risks presented by derivatives that are appropriately executed outside of central 
clearing, and therefore do not benefit from the protections of a central counterparty. 
Timothy Geithner, Secretary, Dept’t of Treasury, Remarks to the International Monetary 
Conference (June 6, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg1202.aspx. 
 51  See, e.g., Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner Written Testimony Before the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Hearing on OTC Derivatives Reform and 
Addressing Systemic Risk, DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg425.aspx (“With careful supervision and regulation of the 
margin and other risk management practices of clearinghouses, central clearing of a 
substantial proportion of OTC derivatives should help to reduce risks arising from the web of 
bilateral interconnections among our major financial institutions. This should reduce the 
prospect of threats to financial stability emerging from the derivative markets.”). 
 52  See, e.g., Michael Greenberger, Diversifying Clearinghouse Ownership in Order to 
Safeguard Free and Open Access to the Derivatives Clearing Market, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP & 
FIN. L. 245, 249 (2013) (explaining the role that CCPs play in eliminating counterparty risk). 
 53  See, e.g., Janet L. Yellen, Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons from the 
Financial Crisis and Policy Implications, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. 15, 16 (Jan. 4, 
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Yellen20130104a.pdf. 
 54  See generally Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857 (2014). 
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institutional arrangements that are designed to enhance contractual performance.”55 
Clearinghouses ensure that each side of the trade gets what the other side has 
promised it. In the United States, clearinghouses have long served the equities, 
options, futures, and fixed income markets.56 However, their active presence in the 
OTC derivatives markets is more recent. Clearinghouses provide a range of post-
execution services, including matching trades, confirming the terms of the 
transaction, netting, and settling trades.57 Of particular importance, if a firm has 
multiple positions with a clearinghouse, positions and associated margin are netted, 
which allows for offsetting positions to cancel one another out.58  
Some clearinghouses, including the ones at issue in this Article, also serve as 
CCPs.59 Once a trade is executed, a CCP steps in as buyer for every seller and seller 
for every buyer. The original contract is novated,60 which means it disappears and is 
replaced by two contracts with the CCP. Each party subsequently interacts only with 
the CCP. The CCP collects collateral from each party to protect itself. A key feature 
of CCPs is loss mutualization—if a party defaults and losses exceed the collateral 
provided by that party, all of the clearing members share any resulting losses. The 
following diagram models a CCP, its members, their clients, the settlement banks 
through which payments are made, and a second CCP with which the first CCP—
most likely through shared clearing members—might also be connected. 
                                                           
 55  Ed Nosal & Robert Steigerwald, What Is Clearing and Why Is It Important?, CHI. FED. 
LETTER, NO. 278, Sept. 2010, at 3. 
 56   For a concise history of clearinghouses in the United States, see Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Fed. Res., Clearinghouses, Financial Stability, and Financial Reform, Speech at the 
2011 Financial Markets Conference (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20110404a.htm. In the United States equities and options 
markets, the CCP can be separate from the trading venue; a market participant can trade in one 
venue and clear the trade in another venue. In the futures markets, trading and clearing venues 
have typically been linked; trades executed on an exchange clear through the exchange’s 
clearing venue. Felix B. Chang, The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses 
Under Regulation, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 747, 767-70. 
 57  See, e.g., Raymond Knott & Alastair Mills, Modelling Risk in Central Counterparty 
Clearing Houses: A Review, FIN. STABILITY REV., Dec. 2002, at 162 n.2. These services need 
not be provided by a CCP. See, e.g., Elisabeth Ledrut & Christian Upper, Clearing Post-
Trading Arrangements for OTC Derivatives, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2007, at 92 (“Given that CCP 
services have been limited to a restricted set of contracts, market participants have explored 
other avenues to obtain some of the benefits of CCPs [including] centralization of information 
or multilateral netting . . . .”). 
 58  See, e.g., Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and 
Settlement: A Comparison of Central Counterparties and Alternate Structures, 30 ECON. 
PERSP. 22, 26 (2006) (describing netting). 
 59  In this article, “CCP” and “clearinghouse” are generally used interchangeably. CFTC-
registered clearinghouses are “derivatives clearing organizations” (“DCOs”). SEC-registered 
clearinghouses are “clearing agencies.” Those terms are also used. For a thorough introduction 
to CCPs, see JON GREGORY, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES: MANDATORY CENTRAL CLEARING 
AND INITIAL MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES 236 (2014). 
 60  See Robert S. Steigerwald, Central Counterparty Clearing, in UNDERSTANDING 
DERIVATIVES—MARKETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 18-20 (2013). An alternative to novation is an 
“open offer” system, in which the counterparties enter into a contract directly with the CCP. 
Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 58, at 28 n.11. 
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Figure 361 
Because each original party to the transaction is left with a contract with the 
CCP, for the remainder of the contract, the buyer and seller no longer have to worry 
about the other’s creditworthiness.62 The creditworthiness of the new counterparty—
the clearinghouse—is all that matters, and—the assumption goes—the CCP ensures 
“minimal, near-zero counterparty risk.”63 In this way, a clearinghouse can protect 
large financial firms from one another by putting itself in between them. As 
Professor Adam Levitin explains, “[b]y separating counterparty risk from position 
risk in swaps transactions, the clearinghouse serves as a systemic-risk circuit breaker 
. . . .”64 During the last crisis, financial institutions rushed to get out of derivatives 
                                                           
 61  Author’s rendering. 
 62  To say that clearing members have no need to worry may be too strong; if the CCP 
properly allocates losses among members, a problem at any counterparty to the CCP can 
expose every other counterparty to the CCP to losses. See Bob Hills et al., Central 
Counterparty Clearing Houses and Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY REV. June 1999, at 128 
(“Ideally the central counterparty should be structured in a way that gives market participants 
a continuing interest in the credit quality of the entities with which they trade and in the 
central counterparty’s ability to monitor and control its credit risk.”). 
 63  Viral V. Acharya et al., Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives, in RESTORING 
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 251 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew 
Richardson eds., 2011). 
 64  Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 
GEO. L.J. 445, 453 (2013). 
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contracts with weakening counterparties by interposing safer counterparties; a CCP 
would eliminate the need to run from failing counterparties.65  
Because clearinghouses collect risk from the market, how they manage that risk 
is of great importance. A key component of risk management is the CCP’s balanced 
book: The contract the CCP enters into with the original seller is offset exactly by 
the contract it enters into with the original buyer. This balance generally means that 
the CCP is protected from market risk, provided neither counterparty defaults on its 
obligations to the CCP. Because members do not always meet their obligations, 
however, CCPs employ other mechanisms to manage risks deriving from the 
members and the products they clear.  
Clearing members (also known as clearing participants) have to meet the CCP’s 
threshold requirements. These requirements may include indicia of financial 
strength, operational capabilities, and effective risk management.66 In addition, 
clearing members have to open an account with at least one of the CCP’s settlement 
banks, through which a clearing member satisfies its financial obligations (such as 
paying variation margin) to the CCP.67 CCPs monitor their members and may 
impose risk-specific restrictions on them—including position limits—to prevent 
overexposure to any particular firm.68 Upon joining a CCP, each member contributes 
to a guaranty (or default) fund, which can be drawn on if one or more members 
                                                           
 65  For a discussion of this benefit, see Beylin, supra note 5, at 49. 
 66  See, e.g., CHI. MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, RULEBOOK Rule 901, 
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CME/I/9/9.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (setting forth 
requirements for clearing members); ICE CLEAR CREDIT, CLEARING RULES Rule 201 (2015), 
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_Rules.pdf (setting forth 
requirements for clearing participants). 
 67  John W. McPartland, Clearing and Settlement of Exchange Traded Derivatives, CHI. 
FED LETTER, No. 267, Oct. 2009, at 2-3. 
 68  See, e.g., CHI. MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, RULEBOOK Rule 8F010, 
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CME/I/8F/8F.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (“[I]f the 
Clearing House determines in good faith that, based on the exercise of prudent risk 
management standards, that [sic] an OTC Clearing Member poses undue risk to the Clearing 
House based on its OTC Derivatives portfolio, the Clearing House may take any or all of the 
following actions with respect to such OTC Clearing Member: 1) impose an additional 
performance bond requirement; 2) prohibit the addition of any new OTC Derivative positions, 
or 3) require the reduction or unwinding of OTC Derivatives positions.”); ICE CLEAR CREDIT, 
supra note 66, at Rule 203(b) ("[F]or the protection of ICE Clear Credit and the Participants, 
ICE Clear Credit shall be authorized: (i) to impose such additional capital, Margin or other 
requirements on a Participant; (ii) to allow such Participant to submit Trades for liquidation 
only; (iii) to limit or restrict the type of Contracts that may be cleared by such Participant in 
any of its accounts with ICE Clear Credit; or (iv) to limit or restrict the aggregate notional or 
other reference amount of positions in Contracts that are permitted to be maintained by such 
Participant in any of its accounts with ICE Clear Credit.”). 
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default and the defaulter’s collateral proves inadequate.69 A clearing member’s 
contribution can be adjusted to reflect the risk posed by that member to the CCP.70  
A firm that wants to or must clear its trades, but is not eligible to become a 
member of a CCP or chooses not to incur the cost, must clear through a clearing 
member. Because the burdens of CCP membership are high,71 most swap market 
participants prefer indirect access through a clearing member or—even more 
indirectly—through a clearing member’s client.72 Few clearing members, however, 
offer client clearing, a development that may constrain the ability of market 
participants to trade derivatives subject to the clearing mandate.73 Even swap dealers 
may not choose to become clearing members.74 
CCPs protect themselves by carefully choosing products for clearing. CCPs 
assess the risk profile of an asset class or product before accepting it for clearing.75 
They use models to determine how to protect themselves from the risks associated 
with clearing these products. These models take into account such factors as how 
prices have moved over time and how one product might interact with other products 
cleared by the CCP.  
Collecting initial margin, which is essentially collateral, is a key way that CCPs 
protect themselves. As the Clearing Timeline below shows, when a contract is first 
cleared, the CCP collects from the clearing member initial margin (also known as a 
                                                           
 69  GREGORY, supra note 59, at 31 (explaining that a key to the CCP “loss mutualisation” 
model is the requirement that “all members pay into [a] default fund [and thus] all contribute 
to absorbing an extreme default loss”). 
 70  IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, at 107 (“Guarantee fund 
contributions should be related to the CM’s market position and the nature of its exposures 
and be reevaluated regularly.”). 
 71  See, e.g., Jo Braithwaite, Legal Perspectives on Client Clearing 9 (LSE Legal Studies 
Working Paper No. 14/2015, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629193 (“The membership criteria for clearing services for OTC 
derivatives are onerous, even by the standards of other clearing services. This is because a 
CCP faces more risk clearing OTC derivatives, which have very high values and long 
maturities compared to other cleared contracts (e.g., for commodities), while the operational 
complexities involved in clearing OTC derivatives are also far greater.”); see also Joe 
Rennison, Nomura Exits Swaps Clearing for US and European Customers, FIN. TIMES (May 
12, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e1883676-f896-11e4-be00-00144feab7de.html 
#axzz3hVR1yzZe. For an estimate of the costs of clearing, see Beylin, supra note 5, at 46. As 
Beylin points out, clearing indirectly is costly too. Id. 
 72  See GREGORY, supra note 59, at 136 (explaining that some market participants, 
“particularly buy side and smaller financial institutions” either may not be eligible for 
membership or “may find the indirect clearing route more efficient”). 
 73  See Arshadur Rahman, Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, Central Clearing and 
Financial Stability, 55 BANK ENGLAND Q. BULL. 283, 290 (2015) (“[T]here are a relatively 
small number of clearing members for these CCPs, and fewer still that offer client clearing. 
Those clearing members that do offer client clearing become more important within the 
system because non-clearing member firms would otherwise be unable to access central 
clearing, hindering their ability to undertake OTC derivatives transactions (especially if these 
contracts become subject to the clearing obligation).”) (internal citation omitted). 
 74  Beylin, supra note 5, at 19 n.45. 
 75  See GREGORY, supra note 59, at 236-37. 
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performance bond)—typically in the form of cash or other liquid assets, such as 
Treasury securities or gold.76 The CCP adjusts the initial margin periodically over 
the term of the contract. Initial margin is designed to protect the CCP from most 
potential future losses should the member default leaving the CCP to wind down the 
defaulter’s portfolio.77 It “is designed to cover the worst-case close out costs (due to 
the need to find replacement transactions) in the event a member defaults.”78 The 
CCP uses models, assumptions, and historical data to set initial margin. An initial 
margin reflects—among other things—the historical price volatility of the product 
and is in proportion to the clearing member’s net or gross position in that product.79 
Initial margin should be sufficient to allow the CCP the time it needs to terminate the 
relevant position if the clearing member defaults.80 In setting an initial margin, 
regulators and market participants strive to cover all but the most extreme loss 
scenarios.81 CCPs rely on complex models to achieve the targeted level of 
coverage.82 As Knott and Mills explain, the “challenge faced by CCPs is to set initial 
                                                           
 76  For a discussion of initial margin, see FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 424, 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 6-7 (2010) 
[hereinafter POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET]; GREGORY, supra note 59, 
at 137. 
 77  See, e.g., Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 58, at 25 (“Margining systems are designed 
to ensure that in the event that a clearing member fails to meet a margin call, sufficient funds 
remain readily available to close out the member’s positions without loss to the CCP in most 
market conditions.”); COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L 
ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 52 (Apr. 
2012), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf [hereinafter CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES] (“A 
CCP should adopt initial margin models and parameters that are risk-based and generate 
margin requirements that are sufficient to cover its potential future exposures to participants in 
the interval between the last margin collection and the close out of positions following a 
participant default.”). 
 78  GREGORY, supra note 59, at 30. 
 79  See McPartland, supra note 67, at 2; see also WALLACE C. TURBEVILLE, DERIVATIVES 
CLEARINGHOUSES IN THE ERA OF FINANCIAL REFORM 9-12 (2010), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2010/12/derivatives_clearinghouses_in_the_era_of_financial_reform.pdf. 
 80  POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET, supra note 76, at 7. 
 81  See, e.g., CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 52 (calling for a confidence level of 
“at least ninety-nine percent with respect to the estimated distribution of future exposure”); Stan 
Ivanov & Lee Underwood, CDS Clearing at ICE: A Unique Methodology, FUTURES INDUSTRY, 
Nov. 2011, at 33, https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/FIA_magazine_CDS_risk_ 
management_article.pdf (“Because it can take several days for the market to absorb the shock of 
default in an OTC market such as such as CDS, the ICE CDS risk methodology has adopted a five-
day risk horizon at a risk quantile of 99%. This means that margins are set to cover five days of 
adverse price/credit spread movements for the portfolio positions with a confidence level of 99%.”); 
LCH.CLEARNET, CCP RISK MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY & RESOLUTION 12, 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762448/final+white+paper+version+three.pdf/1d17
00aa-a1ae-4a6c-8f6f-541eec9b7420 (“Dodd-Frank rules . . . require a minimum 99% confidence 
level for all products. In Europe, EMIR [European Market Infrastructure Regulation] requirements 
go further, with a minimum . . . 99.5% for OTC derivatives. LCH.Clearnet has chosen . . . to apply 
a confidence level of 99.7% across all our products.”). 
 82  To get a sense of the complexity of the margin analysis, see Ben Larah, CCP Margin 
Models: Comparing Historic VaR and SPAN, OTC SPACE (June 6, 2013), 
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margin at a level sufficient to provide protection against all but the most extreme 
price moves, but not so high as to damage market liquidity or discourage use of the 
CCP.”83  
Another way the CCP protects itself is by daily (or more frequently) collecting 
cash variation margin (also known as mark-to-market margin) from clearing 
members. Variation margin reflects daily changes in the market value of clearing 
members’ portfolios.84 Thus, whereas initial margin is collateral for the purpose of 
protecting the CCP against potential future exposures, variation margin is a payment 
that transfers actual market gains and losses between the CCP and its counterparties 
typically within a day of their occurrence.85  
 
Figure 486 
As noted earlier, many firms are not direct CCP members. The clearing members 
through whom these firms clear are responsible for managing their customers’ risk, 
guaranteeing their customers’ contract performance, and collecting and passing on to 
the clearinghouse initial and variation margin for their customers.87 The CCP 
                                                           
http://www.theotcspace.com/2013/06/06/ccp-margin-models-comparing-historic-var-and-
span. 
 83  Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 166. 
 84  See, e.g., CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 54. 
 85  Compare 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ccc) (2016) (defining “initial margin” as “money, securities, 
or property posted by a party to a futures, option, or swap as performance bond to cover 
potential future exposures arising from changes in the market value of the position”), with id. 
§ 1.3(fff) (defining “variation margin” as “a payment made by a party to a futures, option, or 
swap to cover the current exposure arising from changes in the market value of the position 
since the trade was executed or the previous time the position was marked to market”).  
 86  Author’s rendering. 
 87  For a discussion of client clearing, see GREGORY, supra note 59, at 127-29. 
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maintains customer collateral separately from the clearing member’s proprietary (or 
house) collateral.88 If the clearing member defaults, this collateral segregation 
protects customers and facilitates moving customer trades to other clearing members. 
One of the key jobs of a CCP is to protect itself against and plan for member and 
customer defaults. A default destabilizes the CCP’s normally matched book, 
pursuant to which there is one clearing member on one side of a trade and another 
clearing member on the other side of the trade. Planning for defaults requires 
considering operational, legal, and moral hazard issues, among others.89 After a 
default, the CCP has to dispose of the defaulting member’s own positions at the CCP 
and move customer positions and associated collateral.90 The CCP must have enough 
available liquidity to meet all of its cash payout requirements during the default 
period.91 To staunch immediate losses, the CCP can hedge some or all of the 
defaulting firm’s portfolio with new positions in the market.92 The CCP may opt to 
enter into offsetting positions, auction off the defaulting firm’s positions, allocate 
them to non-defaulting clearing members, or tear up the offsetting transactions. The 
CCP may require members to participate in auctions, may open the auction to non-
members, and may provide inducements to bid in the auction.93 A CCP may borrow 
personnel—including traders with relevant expertise—from the clearing members to 
form a committee to assist CCP personnel managing a default. Given the 
complexities of managing a default, CCPs conduct dry runs of default processes to 
prepare members and CCP staff in advance.94  
                                                           
 88  See id. at 223-26 (discussing separation of client and clearing member accounts at 
CCP). 
 89  For an insightful discussion of the complexities of the default processes and preparing 
for a default, see generally Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting 
(Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/mrac_ 
040215_transcript.pdf. 
 90  See JASON QUARRY ET AL., OTC DERIVATIVES CLEARING: PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2012), 
http://www.oliverwyman.com/media/OTC_Derivatives_Clearing.pdf (showing that Lehman 
default was managed without making it past Lehman’s initial margin in the default waterfall); 
Natasha de Terán, How the World’s Largest Default Was Unravelled, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 13, 
2008), http://www.swapclear.com/Images/Lehman%202008%20Financial%20News_tcm14-
59521.pdf (discussing how LCH.Clearnet managed the Lehman default, which included a 
swaps portfolio). 
 91  See, e.g., Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 
89, at 20 (statement of Ian Springle, ICE Clear Credit) (explaining that “part of our 
preparations are making sure that we have sufficient liquid resources to meet our daily cash 
payouts required during a default”). 
 92  For a default management timeline, see INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., ICE CLEAR CREDIT: 
PREPARATIONS FOR A POTENTIAL CLEARING PARTICIPANT DEFAULT 5 (2015), 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/mrac040215presentations
_ice.pdf. 
 93  CME GROUP INC., CME DEFAULT MANAGEMENT 3, 6 (2015), 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/mrac040215presentations
_cme.pdf. 
 94  Id. at 5-7; INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., supra note 92, at 7-8. 
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The defaulting member’s initial margin should cover CCP losses during the 
default management process. If it does not, the CCP proceeds down a so-called 
default waterfall to absorb any remaining losses. A default waterfall typically 
includes the defaulter’s margin, its contributions to the guaranty fund, non-defaulting 
members’ contributions to the guaranty fund, and a contribution from the CCP itself. 
If the losses outstrip these resources, the CCP moves to the unfunded part of the 
waterfall by imposing additional losses on non-defaulting members through 
assessments for additional contributions or haircuts on non-defaulters’ margin. If a 
clearing member’s customer defaults, other customers’ collateral typically is not 
applied to cover losses.95 Under international guidelines, systemically important 
CCPs are supposed to be prepared to handle the simultaneous default of their two 
largest clearing members and their affiliates (the so-called “Cover 2” standard).96 
The following table shows the waterfalls employed by several large OTC 
derivative CCPs in the event of a member default. The CCPs turn to the sources 
listed below in descending order. 
 
Table 1: Default Waterfalls97 
 
CME OTC IRS CME OTC CDS ICE Clear 
Credit—CDS 
LCH Clearnet–
OTC IRS 
EurexOTC Clear 
Defaulted clearing 
member’s IRS 
fund performance 
bonds 
Defaulted 
clearing 
member’s CDS 
fund performance 
bonds 
Defaulted clearing 
member’s margin 
Defaulted clearing 
member margin 
Defaulted clearing 
member margin 
Defaulted clearing 
member’s IRS 
guaranty fund 
contribution 
Defaulted 
clearing 
member’s CDS 
guaranty fund 
contribution 
Defaulted clearing 
member’s 
guaranty fund 
contribution 
Defaulter’s 
default fund 
contribution  
Defaulted clearing 
member clearing 
fund contribution 
                                                           
 95  See GREGORY, supra note 59, at 223-36 (discussing the CFTC’s “legally segregated 
operationally commingled (LSOC)” approach for protecting clearing members’ customers 
from one another). 
 96  CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 36 (“[A] CCP that is involved in activities 
with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions 
should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential 
stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants 
and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the 
CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.”). 
 97  Cleared OTC Financial Products, CME GRP., www.cmegroup.com/trading/otc/cleared-
otc-initiatives.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2016); INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., supra note 92, at 3; 
Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 89, (statement of 
Ian Springle, ICE Clear Credit); Risk Management Overview, LCH.CLEARNET, 
www.lchclearnet.com/risk-collateral-management/risk-management-overview (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2016); EUREX CLEARING, EUREXOTC CLEAR FOR IRS—EMIR (2014), 
http://www.eurexclearing.com/blob/305764/5913f4c9d5a51ed47e59d3a63f21c62b/ 
data/eurex_otc_clear_services.pdf; ICE Clear U.S.: Regulation, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., 
https://www.theice.com/clear-us/regulation (last visited Apr. 23, 2016). 
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CME OTC IRS CME OTC CDS ICE Clear 
Credit—CDS 
LCH Clearnet–
OTC IRS 
EurexOTC Clear 
$150 M. CME 
designated 
working capital  
for IRS guaranty 
fund 
$50 M. CME 
designated 
working capital 
for CDS guaranty 
fund 
Defaulted member 
specific wrong-
way risk guaranty 
fund component 
(if applicable) 
$2 M. LCH. 
Clearnet LLC 
capital  
EUR 50 M EUR 
Dedicated amount 
of Eurex Clearing 
AG 
Non-defaulted 
clearing members 
IRS guaranty fund 
contributions 
Non-defaulted 
clearing members 
CDS guaranty 
fund contribution 
$50 M. ICE 
contribution98  
$260 M. 
SwapClear US-
Domiciled service 
default fund 
Clearing fund 
contributions of 
other members 
Assessment 
Powers (to cover 
3rd and 4th 
largest clearing 
member 
shortfalls) 
Assessment 
powers (to cover 
3rd and 4th 
largest clearing 
member 
shortfalls) 
Non-defaulted 
clearing members’ 
guaranty fund 
contributions/ ICE 
Pro Rata guaranty 
fund contribution 
Unfunded 
contributions – 
Assessments 
Assessment to the 
clearing fund 
  Assessments of 
non-defaulted 
clearing members 
Service continuity  
- variation margin 
haircutting 
Parental guaranty 
   Service closure Remaining equity 
of Eurex clearing 
AG 
 
The default waterfall exposes members to potential losses from the risks taken by 
other members. This feature of CCPs is designed to inspire members to monitor one 
another and the way the CCP manages risks.99 As the next section discusses, 
regulators also actively regulate and monitor CCPs. 
C. How Swap Clearinghouses Are Regulated 
Having placed clearinghouses at the center of OTC derivatives reform, United 
States and international regulators are engaged in an ongoing effort to rethink the 
way they regulate CCPs. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke put it this 
way: “As Mark Twain’s character Pudd’nhead Wilson once opined, if you put all 
your eggs in one basket, you better watch that basket.”100 Titles VII and VIII of 
Dodd-Frank, which address numerous aspects of CCPs, are a central part of that 
effort. In the five years since Dodd-Frank became law, regulators’ focus on CCPs 
has grown as they have begun to ponder the potential consequences of a CCP failure. 
                                                           
 98  This contribution is in two distinct parts: “The 10 first one is the $25 million ICE 
priority contribution, which we use before the nondefaulters’ funding, guaranty fund. We also 
have a pro rata $25 million contribution, which we use prorated during the consumption of the 
nondefaulters, guaranty fund.” Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee 
Meeting, supra note 89, at 28 (statement of Ian Springle, ICE Clear Credit). 
 99  See, e.g., Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 172 (“[M]embers residual exposure to the 
uncovered losses of the CCP . . . creates an incentive for clearing members to take an active 
interest in the overall standard of a CCP’s risk management.”). 
 100  Bernanke, supra note 56. 
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A key feature of the regulatory scheme for OTC derivatives is the registration 
and attendant regulation of CCPs. Clearinghouses that clear swaps must register with 
the CFTC as derivative clearing organizations (DCOs).101 Clearinghouses that clear 
security-based swaps must register with the SEC as clearing agencies.102 The statute 
allows the CFTC and SEC to exempt from registration CCPs that are supervised by 
the other commission or a foreign regulator.103 DCOs and clearing agencies existed 
before Dodd-Frank to clear exchange-traded derivatives and securities, so Dodd-
Frank did not have to create an entirely new regulatory framework for these entities.  
Under both statutory regimes, CCPs are self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), 
which means that—subject to oversight by the relevant commission—they are able 
to write and enforce rules applicable to their members. Clearing agencies are 
arguably subject to more exacting oversight than DCOs because of the statutory 
process by which rules are reviewed.104 DCOs may seek prior CFTC approval105 or 
may simply self-certify to the CFTC that their rules comply with the Commodity 
Exchange Act.106 The CFTC may intervene before the rule takes effect and can 
disapprove a rule filing if the CFTC finds that the rule would violate the Commodity 
Exchange Act.107 By contrast, the SEC routinely reviews and approves substantive 
clearing agency rule filings.108 Additionally, both agencies retain some leverage over 
CCP rules by virtue of the need for CCPs not to alienate their regulators. 
                                                           
 101  Dodd-Frank Act § 725(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2012)). 
 102  Id. § 763(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(g) (2012)). Entities providing clearing 
services for securities must register with the SEC under, and meet the requirements set forth 
in, section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)) and 
rule 17Ab2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ab2-1 (2016). 
 103  Dodd-Frank Act § 725(b) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(h) (2012)) (authorizing CFTC to 
exempt comparably supervised CCPs); id. § 763(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(k) (2012)) 
(authorizing SEC to exempt comparably supervised CCPs). 
 104  See, e.g., CFTC & SEC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND CFTC ON HARMONIZATION 
OF REGULATION 27-32 (2009) (comparing and analyzing the relative merits of the CFTC and 
SEC procedures for SRO rule filings); Derek Fischer, Note, Dodd-Frank’s Failure to Address 
CFTC Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organization Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 69, 89-93 
(2015) (arguing that the SEC’s standard of reviewing SRO rulemaking has more teeth than the 
CFTC’s). 
 105  7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(2) (2012). 
 106  Id. § 7a-2(c)(1) (2012) (“[A DCO] may elect to approve and implement any new rule or 
rule amendment, by providing to the Commission . . . a written certification that the . . . new 
rule, or rule amendment complies with this chapter (including regulations under this 
chapter).”); 17 C.F.R. § 40.6 (2016) (setting forth self-certification process). For an example 
of a self-certification filing, see Letter from Julian Oliver, Chief Compliance Officer, 
LCH.Clearnet Ltd., to Christopher Kirkpatrick, CFTC (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.cftc.gov/filings/orgrules/rule071615lchltddco001.pdf. 
 107  7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(2) & (5) (2012). 
 108  Securities Exchange Act § 19(b)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2012)) 
(generally requiring SROs to file rule amendments with the SEC and the SEC to publish them 
for comment and consider whether to approve them); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2016) (setting 
forth procedures for proposed rule changes by SROs).  
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Dodd-Frank modified the existing regulatory structure for CCPs in a number of 
ways. First, Congress authorized the CFTC and SEC to write tailored rules for swaps 
CCPs.109 Second, the statute directs the commissions to write rules governing 
conflicts of interest at CCPs if “necessary or appropriate to improve the governance 
of, or to mitigate systemic risk, promote competition, or mitigate conflicts of 
interest.”110 Third, Title VII prescribes an “open access” model for swaps CCPs 
pursuant to which they must accept swaps for clearing, regardless of where the 
transactions are executed.111 Open access stands in contrast with the futures model in 
which DCOs are linked with a particular exchange. Fourth, Title VII includes a 
modified and expanded set of “core principles” for DCOs.112 These core principles 
are intended to be guiding principles that afford DCOs “reasonable discretion” in 
compliance.113 There are eighteen principles covering topics including; financial 
resources, participant and product eligibility, risk management, settlement 
procedures, default rules and procedures, rule enforcement, system safeguards, 
reporting, recordkeeping, public disclosure, antitrust, and governance.114 Even 
though most of these topics were covered in the pre-Dodd-Frank core principles 
under the Commodity Exchange Act, Dodd-Frank expanded many to include more 
prescriptive detail.115 Fifth, Dodd-Frank requires each CCP to have a chief 
compliance officer.116 
                                                           
 109  Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012)) (requiring 
DCOs to adhere to rules imposed by the CFTC pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5)); id. § 763(b) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(i), (j) (2012)) (authorizing the SEC to write security-based 
swap clearing agency standards). 
 110  Id. § 726 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8323 (2012)) (directing the CFTC to review the need 
for and adopt conflict-mitigating rules); id. § 765 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8343 (2012)) 
(providing a parallel provision to SEC); see also id. § 725(d) (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 
7a-1 note (2012)) (“[Directing the CFTC to] adopt rules mitigating conflicts of interest in 
connection with the conduct of business by a swap dealer or a major swap participant with a 
[swaps DCO] in which the swap dealer or major swap participant has a material debt or 
material equity investment.”). Congress considered limits on control and voting rights as a 
way to prevent large dealers from becoming too influential at CCPs. The statutory authority 
offers the agencies more leeway than the controversial Lynch Amendment would have. Its 
sponsor, Congressman Stephen Lynch, argued that proposed amendment would have 
“prevent[ed] those big banks and major swap participants, like AIG, from taking over the 
police station—these new clearinghouses . . . by limiting to a 20 percent voting stake the 
ownership interest in those banks and the governance of the clearing and trading facilities.” 
155 CONG. REC. 14711 (2009) (statement of Rep. Lynch). 
 111  Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(C)(iii)(III) (2012)) 
(requiring that DCO provide “fair and open access”); id. § 763 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-
3(a)(2)(B) (2012)) (requiring that clearing agency must “provide for non-discriminatory 
clearing of a security-based swap executed bilaterally or on or through the rules of an 
unaffiliated national securities exchange or security-based swap execution facility”).  
 112  Id. § 725(c) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2) (2012)). 
 113  7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(A)(ii)) (2012). 
 114  Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2) (2012)). 
 115  For example, compare 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(D)(i) (2012) (requiring DCOs to ensure 
that they “possess[ ] the ability to manage the risks associated with discharging the 
responsibilities of the DCO through the use of appropriate tools and procedures” and setting 
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The final component of the Dodd-Frank changes for CCPs is in Title VIII of 
Dodd-Frank, which posits a more stringent regulatory regime for systemically 
important CCPs. Title VIII’s focus on risk management was a natural response to the 
enhanced role CCPs would play under the new regulatory framework. Congress 
prefaced the title with the finding that financial market utilities (“FMUs”) “may 
reduce risks for their participants and the broader financial system, but such utilities 
may also concentrate and create new risks” and thus enhanced regulation was 
warranted.117 Under Title VIII, the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(“FSOC”)—a conclave drawn from other financial regulators—may designate 
systemically important FMUs (and those likely to become systemically important) 
for additional regulatory oversight.118 FSOC has designated eight FMUs, including 
two swaps CCPs.119  
Title VIII charges the SEC and CFTC with writing and enforcing heightened risk 
management standards for designated CCPs and gives the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”) a back-up regulatory role.120 These 
standards are for “promot[ing] risk management [and] safety and soundness,” 
“reduc[ing] systemic risks,” and “support[ing] the stability of the broader financial 
system.”121 The statute mentions a number of specific risk management areas, 
including margin and default procedures, but allows the regulators wide latitude to 
write standards covering other areas.122 A designated CCP must seek pre-approval 
from its regulator for changes in rules, procedures and operations that would 
“materially affect, the nature or level of risks presented by” the CCP.123 
                                                           
forth prescriptions for four risk management areas), with 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(a)(2)(D) (2006), 
amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (requiring DCOs to have “the ability 
to manage the risks associated with discharging the responsibilities of a derivatives clearing 
organization through the use of appropriate tools and procedures”). 
 116  Dodd-Frank Act § 725(b) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(i) (2012)) (requiring DCOs to 
designate a chief compliance officer); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(j) (2012)) 
(requiring clearing agencies to designate a chief compliance officer). 
 117  Id. § 802(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5461(a) (2012)). 
 118  Dodd-Frank Act § 804 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5463 (2012)). For a general overview of 
Title VIII, see Norbert J. Michel, Financial Market Utilities: One More Dangerous Concept in 
Dodd-Frank, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2015/03/financial-market-utilities-one-more-dangerous-concept-in-doddfrank. 
 119  Among the designated FMUs are the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. and ICE Clear 
Credit LLC, both of which clear swaps. Fin. Stability Oversight Council: Designations, DEP’T 
TREASURY (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/ 
default.aspx#FMU. 
 120  Dodd-Frank Act § 805(a)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(2) (2012)) (relating to 
setting standards); id. § 807 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5466 (2012)) (relating to examination and 
enforcement). 
 121  Id. § 805(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(b) (2012)). 
 122  Id. § 805(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(c) (2012)). 
 123  Id. § 806(e) (12 U.S.C. § 5465(e) (2012)). 
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Dodd-Frank directs the CFTC, SEC, and the Federal Reserve to develop a joint 
risk management supervisory framework for CCPs.124 The Federal Reserve’s 
supporting role in CCP oversight allows the SEC and CFTC to benefit from the 
Federal Reserve’s pre-crisis regulatory CCP expertise. It also allows the Federal 
Reserve to have a window into CCPs that might one day avail themselves of Federal 
Reserve accounts, services, and discount window advances—privileges Dodd-Frank 
authorizes the Federal Reserve to make available to designated CCPs.125  
Under Titles VII and VIII, the SEC, CFTC, and the banking regulators have 
engaged in extensive rulemaking, much of it related to CCPs.126 U.S. CCP regulation 
draws heavily from international standards. Dodd-Frank directs the SEC and CFTC 
to “prescribe risk management standards [for systemically designated CCPs], taking 
into consideration relevant international standards and existing prudential 
requirements.”127 International standards governing FMUs predate the financial 
crisis,128 but—as Dodd-Frank notes—have been “evolving” since the crisis.129  
Most significant among the post-crisis efforts are the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (“CPSS”) (subsequently renamed the Committee on Payments 
and Market Infrastructures (“CPMI”)) and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”). These organizations issued a revised set of 
standards for financial market infrastructures, including CCPs, in 2012.130 As 
                                                           
 124  Id. § 813 (12 U.S.C. § 5472 (2012)); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., SEC & CFTC, RISK MANAGEMENT SUPERVISION OF DESIGNATED CLEARING ENTITIES 
(2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/813study.pdf (joint report required by section 
813). 
 125  Dodd-Frank Act § 806 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465); see also Financial Market 
Utilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 76973 (Dec. 20, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 217 & 225) 
(setting out standards under which FMUs can obtain privileges authorized by section 806). 
 126  See, e.g., Derivatives Clearing Organizations General Provisions and Core Principles, 
76 Fed. Reg. 69334 (Nov. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39 & 140); 
Customer Clearing Documentation, Timing of Acceptance for Clearing, and Clearing Member 
Risk Management, 77 Fed. Reg. 21278 (Apr. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 23, 
37, 38 & 39); Clearing Agency Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 66220 (Nov. 2, 2012) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies; 79 Fed. Reg. 29507 
(proposed May 27, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Derivatives Clearing 
Organizations and International Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 72476 (Dec. 2, 2013) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 140 & 190); Enhanced Risk Management Standards for Systemically 
Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 49663 (Aug. 15, 2013) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39); Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74284 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39 & 50). 
 127  Dodd-Frank Act § 805(a)(2)(A) (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(2)(A) (2012)). 
 128  See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK 
NETTING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES (1990), 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d04.pdf; COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECH. 
COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL 
COUNTERPARTIES (2004), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d64.htm.  
 129  See 15 U.S.C. §78q-1(i) (2012) (suggesting that the SEC “conform [security-based 
swap clearing agency] standards or oversight to reflect evolving United States and 
international standards”) (emphasis added). 
 130  CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77. 
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required by Dodd-Frank and encouraged by Basel capital regulations, this lengthy 
list of principles informs United States regulation of CCPs.131  
Drawing the appropriate balance between safety and access is a key theme of the 
CPSS/IOSCO standards. Included in the standards are twenty-four principles for 
establishing and running financial market infrastructures.132 Covered matters include 
governance, credit and liquidity risk management, access, transparency, and default 
management. Table 2 sets forth the relevant principles133 and some key applications 
to CCPs.  
 
Table 2: CPSS/IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures134 
 
# Principle Key applications to CCPs 
1 Legal Basis A CCP should have a clear legal basis (in all relevant jurisdictions) 
for CCP actions, such as novation and netting, which provides 
essential certainty to market participants. 
2 Governance An effective governance arrangement, which balances the interests of 
a CCP’s owners, board of directors, managers, clearing members, 
regulators, and “other stakeholders,”135 allows a CCP to set 
appropriate goals, assess its performance, and manage risk. 
Boards bear responsibility for model validation and should include a 
risk committee, “composed mainly of, and, if possible, led by non-
executive or independent directors.”136 
3 Risk 
management 
framework 
A CCP should establish and test a risk management framework. 
A CCP should incentivize sound risk management by clearing 
members. 
A CCP should review its credit, liquidity, and operational risks and 
risks it poses to others. 
A CCP should assess the scenarios that will prevent it from operating 
normally and develop recovery or wind-down plans. 
4 Credit risk 
management 
A CCP should constantly assess and manage (using margin, 
prefunded guaranty fund contributions, and perhaps credit exposure 
limits) its current and future credit exposures to members. 
A CCP should have the ability to make intraday margin calls. 
A systemically important CCP should “maintain additional financial 
resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios 
that should include . . . the default of the two participants and their 
                                                           
 131  Dodd-Frank Act § 805(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(1) (2012)); see also 
Enhanced Risk Management Standards for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing 
Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 49663 (Aug. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39) (noting 
pressure to adopt international standards to enable CCP users to obtain favorable treatment 
under the Basel capital rules). 
 132  CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 14, Table 1. 
 133  Principles 11 and 24, which are not applicable to CCPs, are omitted 
 134  Author’s summary of CPSS-IOSCO Principles as they apply to CCPs. 
 135  Id. at 26. 
 136  Id. at 28 n.33. 
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# Principle Key applications to CCPs 
affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit 
exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.”137 
(So-called “Cover 2”). 
A CCP should conduct daily multi-scenario stress tests, monthly 
assessments of the robustness of its stress tests, annual validations of 
its risk management models, and reverse stress tests to identify 
implausibly extreme market conditions. 
A CCP should develop rules for allocating losses and disclose its 
default waterfall. 
5 Collateral 
management 
A CCP should collect highly liquid collateral with low credit and 
market risks. 
A CCP should have an effective system for managing margin calls, 
disputes, reporting, deposits, withdrawals, substitutions, and 
liquidations. 
A CCP should think about what will happen to collateral if the 
member posting it defaults and during periods of market stress. 
A CCP should apply conservative, stable haircuts and be mindful of 
the potential for pro-cyclical haircuts to aggravate systemic risk. 
A CCP should consider the unique risks associated with cross-border 
collateral. 
A CCP should impose collateral concentration limits. 
6 Margin A CCP should establish, routinely assess, and backtest a margin 
system to protect itself from counterparty credit risks.  
A CCP’s margin should reflect the risks of the relevant products and 
markets. 
“OTC derivatives require more-conservative margin models because 
of their complexity and the greater uncertainty of the reliability of 
price quotes.”138 
A CCP should use reliable pricing data and appropriate historical 
sample periods. 
A CCP should collect initial margin that “meet[s] an established 
single-tailed confidence level of at least 99 percent of the estimated 
distribution of future exposure.”139 
A CCP should collect variation margin at least daily, be equipped to 
collect intraday, and enforce timely payment. 
In setting margin, a CCP should consider close-out/hedging liquidity, 
cross-product correlations, jump-to-default risk, and tendency for 
margin to be procyclical. 
When netting across products, a CCP should assess correlations 
among the products and the stability of those correlations during 
times of market stress. 
A CCP that cross-margins with other CCPs should coordinate closely 
and continuously monitor the arrangements. 
                                                           
 137  Id. at 36. 
 138  Id. at 51. 
 139  Id. at 50. 
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# Principle Key applications to CCPs 
7 Liquidity risk “A [systemically important] CCP should maintain sufficient liquid 
resources in all relevant currencies to settle securities-related 
payments, make required variation margin payments, and meet other 
payment obligations on time with a high degree of confidence under 
a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not 
be limited to, the default of . . . the two participants and their 
affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment 
obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.”140 
In assessing the sufficiency of its resources, a CCP should count 
“cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial 
banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps . 
. . and repos, . . . , highly marketable collateral held in custody and 
investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with 
prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in 
extreme but plausible market conditions,” and routinely available 
central bank lending if the CCP has the necessary collateral.  
A CCP should have clear procedures for tapping its liquidity in 
ordinary circumstances and emergencies, replenishing depleted 
liquidity, and allocating liquidity shortfalls among its members. 
A CCP should assess its liquidity needs daily, and rigorously stress 
test its ability to meet liquidity demands, reverse stress test for 
extreme but implausible scenarios, and assess the reliability of its 
liquidity providers. 
8 Settlement A CCP should settle transactions at or before the end of the value 
date. 
A CCP’s rules should provide clear rules about when a settlement is 
final. 
9 Money 
settlements 
A CCP should settle in central bank money, when possible, and 
otherwise in assets with low credit and liquidity risk and should 
monitor its settlement banks. 
A CCP should (if possible) use multiple commercial settlement 
banks. 
10 Physical 
deliveries 
A CCP should have clear rules with respect to physical deliveries and 
should identify, monitor, and manage the risks of physical 
instruments or commodities. 
12 Exchange-of-
value 
settlement 
systems 
A CCP should ensure that, with respect to linked settlements, it 
conditions settlement of each linked obligation on the settlement of 
the other. 
13 Participant 
default rules 
and 
procedures 
A CCP should have clear rules and procedures and appropriate tools 
for identifying, managing, and containing the consequences of 
member defaults. 
These procedures should cover prompt close-out of the defaulter’s 
positions, hedging, auctions, and seconding of member personnel to 
help manage defaults. 
Key aspects of the default rules should be public. 
                                                           
 140  Id. at 57. 
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# Principle Key applications to CCPs 
A CCP, working with its members, should test default procedures at 
least annually. 
A CCP should consider requiring members to participate in auctions 
and, if necessary, take a share of the defaulter’s portfolio. 
A CCP should clearly set forth the order in which resources will be 
used to absorb default losses and the obligations of non-defaulting 
members. 
14 Segregation 
and portability 
A CCP should be able to identify, protect, and (in the event of 
default) move the positions and collateral of its members’ customers.  
A CCP should segregate customer collateral from member collateral 
and may segregate customer collateral from other customer collateral. 
A CCP should strive for certainty under applicable legal frameworks. 
A CCP should disclose its segregation and portability arrangements, 
including whether customer accounts are protected on an individual 
or omnibus basis. 
15 General 
business risk 
A CCP should identify, monitor, and manage its general business 
risks. 
A CCP should have sufficient, high quality, equity-funded liquid 
assets to cover at least 6 months of operations and a board-approved 
plan for replenishing equity. 
When contemplating expansion, a CCP should carefully assess the 
risks. 
16 Custody and 
investment 
risks 
A CCP should hold its and its members’ assets at sound, well-
regulated, well-vetted custodians that have proper legal protections in 
place and should consider using different custodians to hold margin 
and guaranty fund assets. 
A CCP should employ a conservative investment strategy. 
17 Operational 
risk 
A CCP should identify, assess, and manage its operational risks 
(external events, information technology issues, etc.) and should 
ensure its operational capacity can accommodate increased volumes 
during a period of stress. 
A CCP should have a business continuity plan, including a back-up 
site, so it can resume halted operations within 2 hours of a disruption 
and settle by day’s end. 
A CCP should employ the necessary personnel, set operational 
reliability objectives, and test its risk management framework. 
A CCP should assess its vulnerability to problems at members, 
service providers, and other market infrastructures and perhaps 
require them to meet minimum operational standards and should 
closely oversee critical service providers. 
18 Access and 
participation 
requirements 
A CCP’ should permit “fair and open access” pursuant to reasonable, 
objective, published, risk-based criteria.141 
A CCP should strive for “the least restrictive impact on access” 
possible.142 
                                                           
 141  Id. at 101. 
 142  Id.  
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# Principle Key applications to CCPs 
A CCP may impose operational, risk management, financial, and 
legal requirements on members, but should avoid sized-based 
requirements.  
A CCP can tailor participation limits to a member’s risk. 
A CCP should monitor its members. 
19 Tiered 
participation 
arrangements 
A CCP should consider unique risks arising from market participants 
clearing through a clearing member, should require members to 
provide information about and manage risks of indirect participants, 
and should pay particular attention to high-volume indirect 
participants and interdependencies between members and indirect 
participants. 
A CCP may want to urge a high-volume indirect participant to 
become a member. 
A CCP should understand how its members handle indirect 
participant defaults. 
20 Financial 
Market 
Infrastructure 
Links 
A CCP should identify, monitor, and manage the credit, liquidity, 
legal, operational, and financial risks of linking with other financial 
market infrastructures.  
Risk management for CCP-to-CCP links should be tailored 
depending on whether it is a peer-to-peer or participant link, should 
consider “potential spill-over effects from the default of the linked 
CCP,”143 should include daily should mark-to-market, should 
consider risks associated with end-of-the-waterfall loss allocations, 
and should consider risks associated with providing margin to or 
participating in the default fund of the other CCP. 
21 Efficiency and 
effectiveness 
A CCP should set objectives for meeting members’ needs efficiently 
and effectively, should test whether it is meeting those objectives, 
and should consider direct and indirect costs (including the 
opportunity cost of member assets). 
22 Commun-
ication 
A CCP should communicate with its members using “internationally 
accepted communication procedures and standards.”144 
23 Disclosure of 
rules, key 
procedures & 
market data 
A CCP should clearly and publicly disclose changes in rules and 
procedures and relevant information, such as its system design, 
operations, risk management framework, financial condition, 
procedures, rules, membership risks, fees and other participation 
costs, and transaction data. 
 
This list provides useful insight into the complexity of CCP management and the 
tensions between open access and risk management. Proper CCP management 
requires careful consideration and balancing of an array of risk management 
questions and important operational and legal issues. These standards reflect the 
reality that “[a financial market infrastructure] and its participants may generate 
significant negative externalities for the entire financial system and real economy if 
                                                           
 143  Id. at 109. 
 144  Id. at 119. 
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they do not adequately manage their risks.”145 The CPSS/IOSCO report notes that 
with respect to CCPs, clearing mandates have underscored the importance of both 
access to CCPs146 and “the objectives of safety and efficiency are even more 
pertinent because national authorities have required or proposed the mandatory use 
of centralised clearing” in markets, including the OTC derivatives markets.147 
Ironically, while the current regulatory framework is nominally incorporating these 
risk management principles, it also undermines CCPs’ ability to adhere to them. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The central clearing mandate and the regulatory infrastructure that has risen up 
around it, although well-intentioned, threaten financial stability. Academic 
observers, especially including Professor Craig Pirrong, have raised concerns about 
CCPs’ potential deleterious effects on financial stability.148 While citing the risk-
reducing aspects of CCPs, recent annual reports of the Office of Financial Research 
and Financial Stability Oversight Council also identified CCPs as a potential source 
of systemic risk.149 
Carefully designed and operated central clearinghouses can facilitate risk 
management by firms and contribute to broader financial stability. Design, however, 
matters greatly.150 Regulatory micro-interference in clearing, which can upset careful 
designs, is harmful to individual firm risk management and to financial stability. 
Together, the clearing mandate, the regulatory influences on the design and 
operation of CCPs, and the implicit government backstop threaten to destabilize 
CCPs, individual firms’ risk management, and the broader financial system.  
                                                           
 145  Id. 11. 
 146  Id. 15. 
 147  Id. at 11. 
 148  See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, A Bill of Goods: Central Counterparties and Systemic Risk, 2 
J. FIN. MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES 55 (2014) [hereinafter Pirrong, Bill of Goods]; Craig Pirrong, 
The Clearinghouse Cure, REG., Winter 2008-2009, at 44; see also Levitin, supra note 64, at 
453; Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (2013); Serge 
Wibaut & D. Sykes Wilford, Markets for CCPs and Regulation: Considering Unintended 
Consequences, 34 INST. J. FIN. TRANSACTIONS 105 (2012). 
 149  FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 111 (2015), https://www. 
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/2015%20FSOC%20Annual%20Report.pdf 
(identifying CCPs as a “potential emerging threat and vulnerability”); OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 
2014 ANNUAL REPORT 66 (2015), https://financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of-
financial-research-annual-report-2014.pdf (noting that “[b]anks could face significant losses if a 
CCP experienced losses and transmitted them to clearing members” and highlighting potential 
liquidity effects of margin requirements). 
 150  See, e.g., Hamed Amini et al., Systemic Risk and Central Counterparty Clearing 31 
(Swiss Fin. Inst. Research, Working Paper No. 13-34, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275376 (finding that “a CCP does not always reduce systemic risk,” 
but that they can reduce systemic risk if their fee and guaranty fund policies are properly 
designed). 
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A. Potential for Expanded CCPs to Destabilize the Financial System 
By nature, CCPs are deeply interconnected with large financial companies and 
potentially with other CCPs. CCPs have direct relationships with clearing members 
and settlement banks, which tend to be large firms, and indirect relationships with 
clearing members’ customers, which may also be large firms. The intricacy of these 
relationships makes it difficult for market participants and regulators to get a good 
understanding of the risks associated with CCPs.151 Pirrong has warned that “clearing 
has turned out to be the Mother of All Interconnections, because every big financial 
institution is connected to all big CCPs, and because pretty much everyone has to 
funnel the bulk of their derivatives trades through clearinghouses.”152 Because CCPs 
are so large, interconnected, and integral to the operation of the financial markets, 
many market observers have identified them as Dodd-Frank’s addition to the too-
big-to-fail ranks.153 Taking it a step further, one expert noted that they ought to be 
categorized as “V-SIFIs”—very important systemically important financial 
institutions154—to distinguish them from their too-big-to-fail brethren—the 
systemically important financial institutions that are designated for special Federal 
Reserve oversight in Title I of Dodd-Frank. 
                                                           
 151  See, e.g., Steigerwald, supra note 60, at 23 (“CCPs provide enhanced transparency for 
cleared financial contracts. Such transparency is beneficial, but it comes packaged in an 
institutional form that also contains undeniable, and perhaps, irreducible opacity.”). 
 152  See Craig Pirrong, The Fifth Year of the Frankendodd Life Sentence, 
STREETWISEPROFESSOR.COM (July 21, 2015), http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=9472; see also 
Colleen M. Baker, The Federal Reserve’s Supporting Role Behind Dodd-Frank’s 
Clearinghouse Reforms, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 177, 186 (2013) (“[W]ell-intentioned 
reforms of OTC derivatives markets could ultimately create an impossibly interconnected, 
concentrated, international web of clearinghouses, central banks, and swap lines resulting in a 
solution potentially worse than the original problem.”). 
 153  See, e.g., Julia Lees Allen, Note, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A 
Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1100 (2012) (“[T]he 
mandatory clearing provisions . . . in reality force the creation of a new wave of too-big-to-fail 
financial institutions: derivatives clearinghouses.”); Frances Coppola, It’s Not Just Banks That 
Are Too Big to Fail, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/ 
2014/04/30/its-not-just-banks-that-are-too-big-to-fail/ (“CCPs are unquestionably too big to 
fail. In seeking to end “too big to fail” in OTC derivatives trading, we may actually have made 
the problem worse.”); McPartland, supra note 67, at 3 (“Bringing even more derivatives 
instruments into clearing and settlement systems will concentrate market and operational risk 
even more than today, making it all the more important that CCPs function flawlessly.”); 
Hester Plumridge, What If a Clearing House Failed?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204397704577074023939710652 (“Clearing 
houses may be the next too-big-to-fail institutions . . . . [T]hey are about to take on a lot more 
risk, and there is no plan in place to deal with a big player failing. That should set alarm bells 
ringing.”); James Rundle, Helping Clearing Houses Avoid a Crash, FIN. NEWS (May 20, 
2015), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2015-05-20/helping-rescuers-avoid-turbulence-
clearing-houses (“Having been given such a level of systemic importance by world leaders, 
the scenario that some clearers may, in fact, become too big to fail, ironically a state of play 
that the regulators have been trying to stamp out among clearing members, is very real.”). 
 154  Manmohan Singh, Making OTC Derivatives Safe—A Fresh Look 18 (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No. 11/66, 2011), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/ 
2011/wp1166.pdf. 
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To attract users, CCPs have an incentive to be large and to clear multiple product 
types. Seeking to maximize their ability to net positions and economize on initial 
margin and guaranty fund contributions, users favor a CCP that enables them to net 
across many counterparties and multiple products. CCPs face strong pressure to clear 
multiple products or link with other CCPs because the alternative to central 
clearing—bilateral netting—occurs across asset classes. Professors Darrell Duffie 
and Haoxiang Zhu show that”[r]elative to the case of fully bilateral netting (no 
clearing), substantial [counterparty risk reduction] benefits can be obtained by the 
joint clearing of the four major classes of derivatives” and call for “the joint clearing 
of standard interest-rate swaps and credit default swaps in the same 
clearinghouse.”155 Risk management, already complex for CCPs clearing OTC 
derivatives, is even more difficult in large, multi-product CCPs. 
An alternative to clearing products in the same CCP is linking CCPs. 
International Monetary Fund economist Manmohan Singh explains that the “ideal 
‘first-best’ solution” would be a “single CCP with an adequate multicurrency central 
bank liquidity backstop that is regulated and supervised and spans the broadest range 
of derivatives.”156 He explains that interoperability—a process by which CCPs link 
together for the convenience of their clearing members—is “a proxy for [this] ‘first-
best’ solution.”157 Regulators, recognizing these netting efficiencies and drawn to the 
ease of overseeing a few large CCPs rather than many smaller ones, may also favor 
large, interlinked CCPs.158 To date, however, calls for interoperability of derivatives 
CCPs have mostly not materialized, in part because of the thorny risk management 
issues such linkages produce.159  
CCPs function by making and receiving payments according to a strict timeline. 
For example, after marking positions to market, the CCP collects variation margin 
from the accounts of losing parties and credits it to the accounts of winning parties. 
Adherence to a strict timeline of payments is important to keep the system working. 
During a crisis, CCPs likely would face significant liquidity strains.160 Professor 
                                                           
 155  Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce 
Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74, 76, 83 (2011). 
 156  Singh, supra note 154, at 5; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY, supra note 70, at 93 (“A single global CCP for OTC derivatives would provide 
maximum economies of scale and systemic counterparty risk reduction, but similar 
efficiencies can be achieved by linking multiple CCPs . . . .”). 
 157  Singh, supra note 154, at 7. 
 158  Regulatory territorialism may act as a brake on CCP size and interoperability. The 
CFTC and its European counterparts, for example, have been struggling over whether U.S. 
CCPs will be recognized in Europe. See, e.g., Joint Statement of CFTC Chairman Timothy 
Massad and European Commissioner Jonathan Hill (May 7, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/ 
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/massadstatement050715 (providing progress update on 
“discussions on a possible equivalence decision by the European Commission for central 
counter parties (CCPs) that are regulated and supervised by the CFTC”). 
 159  For a concise discussion of the costs and benefits of interoperability, see GREGORY, 
supra note 59, at § 8.5.1.  
 160  See, e.g., Paul Tucker, Central Counterparties in Evolving Capital Markets: Safety, 
Recovery and Resolution, 17 BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. STABILITY REV. 179, 183 (2013) 
(highlighting likely liquidity needs of a CCP managing a default); Transcript of CFTC Market 
Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 89, at 83 (statement of Susan McLaughlin, 
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Mark Roe points out “the collateral available to one creditor, namely the 
clearinghouse, is value denied to other creditors.”161 If those other creditors are also 
systemic, the CCP may not serve to reduce systemic risk.162 Knott and Mills note that 
a CCP could destabilize the financial system by making protective margin calls that 
cause members “to sell assets in a second market, driving down prices there.”163 
They further explain that if margin payments are delayed, “the CCP may redistribute 
part of its risk to liquidity providers such as banks.”164 A CCP without adequate 
liquidity to pay its counterparties would cause those counterparties in turn to miss 
payments.165 Pirrong explains numerous ways in which the clearing mandate 
contributes to systemic risk, including (as Roe also argues) by shifting risk from 
derivatives counterparties to other creditors of failed firms, increasing borrowing to 
meet margin requirements, creating large demands for liquid assets during times of 
great stress, and imposing losses on firms through the default fund at times when 
those firms can least bear them.166  
                                                           
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.) (“[I]f a CCP were for some reason unable to perform on the 
defaulting member's payment obligations in a timely manner and in the expected currency, its 
surviving members would face liquidity shortfalls that would quickly trigger a cascade of 
failures on their obligations to their counterparties beyond the CCP, transmitting liquidity risk 
more broadly to a wider set of market participants.”). 
 161  Roe, supra note 148, at 1664. 
 162  Id. at 1671-72. But see Squire, supra note 54, at 891 (arguing that CCPs are stability 
enhancing because they ensure that some creditors get paid quickly without slowing down 
payments to other creditors). 
 163  Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 164; see also Dietrich Domanski et al., Central 
Clearing; Trends and Current Issues, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2015, at 72, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1512g.pdf (“[E]xtreme price movements in cleared 
financial instruments could result in large variations in the exposure of clearing members to 
the CCPs and therefore in the need for some of them to make correspondingly large variation 
margin payments. Such payments can be large, even if margin requirements remain 
unchanged. But they may be exacerbated if the CCP increases initial margins and/or tightens 
collateral standards in the face of unusually large price movements. The interaction of such 
sudden and large shifts in collateral flows with the wider financial system is untested . . . . The 
demands and dispositions of CCPs could lead to big shifts in collateralised markets, adding to 
risk aversion and increasing pressure to reduce leverage in a procyclical manner.”). 
 164  Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 164. 
 165  See, e.g., Patrick M. Parkinson, Speech to Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual 
Over the Counter Derivatives Symposium: CCP Liquidity Risk Management and Related 
Failure Management Issues (Apr. 11, 2014) (noting that “central concern with respect to CCP 
liquidity risk is that a failure of one or more clearing members to meet variation margin calls 
on time could cause the CCP itself to be unable to meet its own payment obligations as and 
when expected” and that “[s]uch a failure could jeopardize the ability of its nondefaulting 
clearing members to meet their payment obligations when expected and thus is a potential 
vector for financial contagion”). 
 166  Pirrong, Bill of Goods, supra note 148, at 62-74; see also Daniel K. Tarullo, Speech at 
the Office of Financial Research and Financial Stability Oversight Council's 4th Annual 
Conference on Evaluating Macroprudential Tools: Complementarities and Conflicts: 
Advancing Macroprudential Policy Objectives (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/tarullo20150130a.htm (raising concerns about, among other things, CCPs 
imposing losses on large firms during times of crises). 
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Further complicating matters, clearing members are likely to be large financial 
institutions that play multiple roles and have multiple relationships with each CCP. 
Clearing members may themselves be or may be affiliated with settlement banks or 
the providers of lines of credit on which CCPs rely.167 Prearranged lines of credit 
might not materialize during a crisis, particularly if the lending bank is a clearing 
member.168 Federal Reserve Governor Powell points out that “[t]he failure of a large 
clearing member that is also a key service provider could disrupt the smooth and 
efficient operation of one or multiple CCPs, and vice versa.”169 The CCP has to 
consider the full scope of its relationship with clearing members when, for example, 
it considers the effects of a member default or a margin call or assessment on 
surviving members.170 
The 1987 stock market crash illustrated how closely CCPs are tied to the banking 
system, how important payment timing is, and how CCPs can adversely affect the 
financial system during a crisis.171 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, 
who studied the issue, concluded that the “the system taken as a whole (i.e., 
including the Fed) performed acceptably during the crash.”172 However, the clearing 
                                                           
 167  Froukelien Wendt, Central Counterparties: Addressing Their Too Important to Fail 
Nature 9 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/21, 2015), https://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1521.pdf (“Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and 
other commercial banks may fulfill roles of general clearing member (clearing for clients), 
liquidity provider, depository bank, custodian and settlement bank.”). 
 168  See, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 165; Steigerwald, supra note 60, at 21-22. 
 169  Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Speech at the 17th 
International Banking Conference: A Financial System Perspective on Central Clearing of 
Derivatives 4 (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
powell20141106a.htm (“To carry out their critical functions, CCPs rely on a wide variety of 
financial services from other financial firms, such as custody, clearing, and settlement. Many 
of these services are provided by the same global financial institutions that are also the largest 
clearing members of the CCPs.”); see also Domanski et al., supra note 163, at 59, 68 (“The 
CCP’s own liquid assets and backup liquidity lines made available by banks may provide 
effective insurance against liquidity shocks resulting from the difficulties of one or a few 
clearing members. But they can hardly provide protection in the event of a systemic shock, 
when a large number of clearing participants – potentially including the providers of liquidity 
lines – become liquidity-constrained, thereby triggering domino effects.”). 
 170  See, e.g., Wendt, supra note 167, at 9 (“[A CCP is a] particularly vulnerable to the 
default of a service-providing clearing member . . . not only because it has to cover the default 
of the clearing member, but because it may also lose access to the collateral kept by that 
clearing member in its role as custodian[,] . . . may lose access to the credit lines that were 
provided by the defaulting clearing member and it may face operational problems due to the 
loss of one of its settlement banks.”). 
 171  See generally DEP’T TREASURY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET 
MECHANISM (1988), https://archive.org/details/reportofpresiden01unit (known as the Brady 
Commission Report, describing the events of the 1987 crash); see also McPartland, supra note 
67, at 3 (“[A] CCP can only remove market risk from its clearing system when the national 
banking system is open.”). McPartland goes on to explain that “late settlement payments 
associated with derivatives markets were one of the root causes of near payments gridlock 
during the 1987 market crash.” Id. at 3.  
 172  Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 133, 
134 (1990). 
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and settlement system suffered from “malfunctions of communications and 
information processing systems” and “financial gridlock as banks and other creditors 
became cautious about transferring funds to individuals or institutions whose 
solvency might be in doubt.”173 These fears seemed to have helped to drive prices 
down.174 Bernanke further notes that clearinghouses’ sensible margin calls “were 
widely criticized in postmortems for ‘draining liquidity from the system.’”175 Federal 
Reserve intervention kept the system functioning through the 1987 crisis.176 
Since 1987, systems have improved, but real concerns remain about how well a 
CCP could continue to function in the face of even one member default, if the 
financial system were also facing other stresses. Would “sensible margin calls” once 
again threaten the financial system? Because of new post-crisis rules, liquid assets 
will be at even more of a premium than they were during the last crisis.177  
Default management might also be difficult in the Dodd-Frank world of stricter 
capital standards and mandatory clearing. Strict capital requirements may prevent 
non-defaulting clearing members from taking on the defaulter’s client’s portfolios.178 
Particularly if the defaulter’s portfolio contains unusual products, the CCP may not 
be able to borrow the needed trading personnel from non-defaulting members, who 
may not be able to part with their expertise during a crisis.179 Multiple CCPs may be 
competing for the same liquid assets, personnel, capacity of clearing members to 
take on additional positions from defaulters’ portfolios, and perhaps even capacity of 
clearing members to replenish guaranty funds or meet unfunded assessments. 
Professor Mark Roe notes that CCPs are not well-suited to handle crises like the 
last one in which multiple firms ran into trouble simultaneously. Not only would 
CCPs potentially be vulnerable,180 but they could make matters worse by 
transmitting problems to a broader set of firms.181 If one CCP were affected, others 
would likely also be affected.182 As the following table illustrates, CCPs share many 
members, which eases risk transmission from one CCP to another. 
                                                           
 173  Id. at 146-47. The IMF points to the role that operational weaknesses played during the 
1987 crash in the near failures of the CME and the OCC. IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORT, supra note 30, at 108-109. 
 174  Bernanke, supra note 172, at 148. 
 175  Id. at 147. 
 176  Id. at 149 (“[T]he Federal Reserve, in its lender-of-last-resort capacity . . . induce[d] the 
banks (by suasion and by the supply of liquidity) to make loans on customary terms, despite 
chaotic conditions and the possibility of severe adverse selection of borrowers.”). 
 177  See, e.g., Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 61440 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329). 
 178  Transcript of CFTC Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 89, at 95 
(statement of Emily Portney, JPMorgan). 
 179  See, e.g., id. at 89 (statement of Scott Flood, Citi’s Inst. Client Grp.) 
 180  Roe, supra note 148, at 1675. For a helpful illustration of how problems at a CCP could 
spread, see Wendt, supra note 167. 
 181  Roe, supra note 148, at 1675. 
 182  See Domanski et al., supra note 163, at 68-69 (“In the extreme case, the default of 
common clearing members could threaten the resilience of several CCPs at the same time 
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Table 3: Overlapping CCP Members183 
 
Members CME 
IRS 
CME 
CDS 
ICE Clear 
Credit 
LCH Clearnet 
LLC OTC CDS 
Bank of America, N.A.   ●  
Bank of Montreal  ●   
Barclays Bank PLC   ●  
Barclays Capital Inc. ● ● ● ● 
BNP Paribas Securities Corp. ● ● ● ● 
Citibank N.A.   ● ● 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. ● ● ● ● 
Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank  ●   
Credit Suisse International ● ● ●  
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC ● ● ● ● 
Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch   ●  
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. ● ● ● ● 
Goldman Sachs Bank USA    ● 
Goldman Sachs International   ●  
Goldman, Sachs & Co. ● ● ● ● 
HSBC Bank plc   ●  
HSBC Bank USA, N.A.   ●  
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc. ● ● ●  
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC ● ● ● ● 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association   ● ● 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Incorporated 
● ● ●  
Merrill Lynch International   ●  
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC ● ● ● ● 
Morgan Stanley Capital Services LLC   ●  
Nomura International PLC   ●  
Nomura Securities International, Inc.  ● ● ● 
Rabo Securities USA Inc.  ●   
RBC Capital Markets LLC  ●   
                                                           
[which], in turn, would impose strains on the surviving clearing members, propagating 
systemic risk.”) 
 183  Clearing Firms, CME GRP., www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/clearing-firms.html 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2016); Ice Clear Credit: Participants, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., 
http://www.theice.com/clear-credit/participants (last visited Apr. 23, 2016); Current 
Membership, LCH.CLEARNET, www.lchclearnet.com/members-clients/members/current-
membership (last visited Apr. 23, 2016). 
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Members CME 
IRS 
CME 
CDS 
ICE Clear 
Credit 
LCH Clearnet 
LLC OTC CDS 
Royal Bank of Canada  ●   
SG Americas Securities, LLC  ● ●  
Société Générale ●  ●  
The Bank of Nova Scotia  ● ●  
The Royal Bank of Scotland plc  ●   
The Toronto-Dominion Bank  ●   
UBS AG, London Branch   ● ● 
UBS Securities LLC ● ● ● ● 
Wells Fargo Securities, LLC  ● ● ● 
 
If a CCP stopped meeting its obligations altogether, it could greatly impede 
markets. A CCP that cannot meet its payment obligations could stop the markets for 
which it clears from functioning.184 Because CCPs tend to dominate particular 
markets, there might not be a substitute CCP, so the market for any OTC derivatives 
cleared at the failing CCP and subject to the clearing mandate would lock up. The 
statutory framework does not explicitly allow for emergency termination or 
suspension of the clearing mandate,185 which could help to alleviate the problem. The 
status of contracts at a failing CCP would also be uncertain and perhaps that status 
would not be resolved for a long time.186  
B. Potential for Clearing Mandate to Undermine Risk Management Outside the CCP 
Although characterized as a risk management measure, the clearing mandate may 
impede market participants’ ability to measure and manage their risks. The clearing 
mandate affects how firms manage their business risks and exposures to CCPs and 
other firms. 
                                                           
 184  See, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 165 (“If confidence in a CCP is shattered and, as is 
often the case, no other CCP serves the market, the market would cease functioning.”). 
 185  FIA Europe raised a different permutation of this issue—a CCP would have to continue 
clearing a product subject to a clearing mandate and taking on the associated risk during a 
crisis. FIA EUR., A REVIEW OF THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN DERIVATIVES LAW 
REFORM 12 (2015), https://europe.fia.org/sites/default/files/content_attachments/ 
FIA%20Europe_%20A%20review%20of%20the%20cumulative%20effect%20of%20Europea
n%20derivatives%20reform_Position%20Paper.pdf (“[T]he clearing obligation cannot be 
terminated or suspended as a matter of urgency in extreme circumstances. This means that 
CCPs may find themselves clearing more risk in a contract or product than there would be 
market capacity to manage upon a member default. A CCP may therefore have no option but 
to encourage participants to reduce these clearing provisions by increasing margin 
requirements to levels at which it is uneconomic to hold the positions and thus force the risk to 
be closed out.”). 
 186  See, e.g., David Elliott, Central Counterparty Loss-Allocation Rules 6 (Bank of 
England, Fin. Stability, Paper No. 20, 2013), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper20.pdf (discussing how “[t]he failure of a 
CCP could be very disruptive”). 
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A frequently cited risk management concern relates to the effect that clearing 
will have on bilateral netting. Dealers in the OTC markets use netting to manage 
their exposures to other counterparties, but mandatory clearing affects their ability to 
do this.187 Singh has explained that mandatory clearing can interfere with bilateral 
netting as some contracts are moved to CCPs and others remain bilateral contracts.188 
Bilateral netting opportunities with a particular counterparty decrease if some of the 
transactions with that counterparty are moved to a CCP. 
The clearing mandate and associated disincentives on using uncleared swaps—
such as higher margin requirements for uncleared swaps, capital charges, and anti-
evasion provisions—may discourage firms from dealing in and using uncleared 
swaps. The emphasis on clearing has overshadowed the value of these bilateral 
agreements, which enable companies to manage their risks with a greater precision 
than they could with standardized products. Firms may forgo derivatives-based 
hedging altogether or may use a less tailored cleared product to hedge their risk.189 If 
companies do so, there will be unhedged business risk. Alternatively, Columbia 
University scholar Ilya Beylin argues that market participants seeking to avoid the 
clearing mandate could resort to more complicated, less transparent, and therefore 
more risky transactions.190 Not only do bilateral derivatives offer firms the chance to 
manage their risks precisely, but they are also often part of a larger customer 
relationship between a company and a dealer bank. That relationship may include 
unique collateral arrangements, such as arrangements that allow a firm to post 
illiquid assets or not to post collateral below a specified threshold. Forcing 
derivatives transactions into CCPs, which cannot replicate these accommodations, 
will disrupt these bilateral relationships. 
New risk management challenges also arise in connection with the heavier 
collateral demands associated with central clearing. Both clearing members and their 
customers will have to post collateral in the liquid form demanded by CCPs.191 
Customers may enter into new relationships to borrow collateral. As Jon Gregory 
points out, CCPs demand variation margin from losing counterparties more 
frequently than they post it to gaining counterparties.192 If banks meet the demand by 
                                                           
 187  For a discussion of this topic, see Paul M. McBride, The Dodd-Frank Act and OTC 
Derivatives: The Impact of Mandatory Central Clearing on the Global OTC Derivatives 
Market, 44 INT’L LAW. 1077, 1106-08 (2010). 
 188  Singh, supra note 154, at 4 (“Offloading only standard contracts will adversely impact 
the net exposure on their books as this will ‘unbundle’ netted positions.”). 
 189  For an excellent discussion of the potential for lost hedging opportunities and increased 
costs for swaps end users as a result of the central clearing mandate, see McBride, supra note 
187, at 1111-19. Market observers have noted that futures products are emerging to take the 
place of certain types of swaps. See, e.g., COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PUBLIC 
ROUNDTABLE ON FUTURIZATION OF SWAPS (2013), www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/ 
documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission13_013113-trans.pdf. 
 190  Beylin, supra note 5, at 15, 48. 
 191  For a discussion of the association between central clearing and high collateral 
demands, see Singh, supra note 154, at 5. 
 192  GREGORY, supra note 59, at 151 (“CCPs may make one or more intradaily margin calls 
per day and typically only return margin once a day. Such effects would be most pronounced 
during volatile markets where large price moves may cause CCPs to ask for very large 
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lending liquid assets to their customers to post as collateral, “the tail risk may not 
leave their books,” as central clearing proponents hoped it would.193 The magnitude 
of that risk may be difficult to estimate. A more technical concern, raised by 
Professor Ronald Anderson and Karin Jõeveer, is the likely operational strains on 
clearing members of frequent margin calls by CCPs.194 
Greater use of CCPs raises new concerns about exposure to clearinghouse risk. 
Clearing members and—to a lesser degree—their customers have to estimate and 
manage the risks they face because of their interactions with CCPs. As Table 1 
shows, CCPs employ a default waterfall that maps out loss allocations in the event of 
a member default, but what happens at the end of the waterfall may not be clear. 
Also unclear is whether and how any of the losses CCP clearing members bear will 
be shared with their customers.195 These uncertainties make modeling CCP risk 
difficult. A JPMorgan research paper found that “for realistic assumptions, the 
systemic CCP risk a clearing member is exposed to is not negligible” and “is given 
by a sum of exposures to each of the clearing members.”196 To enable more precise 
modeling of their exposure to CCPs, clearing members are pushing for greater ex 
ante clarity about what will happen if a CCP runs into trouble.197 To manage their 
risk, members need to understand whether tail losses will be absorbed by CCP 
                                                           
intraday margins from some participants covering their losses, whilst possibly not returning 
immediately the equivalent margin against gains of other clearing members.”). 
 193  Singh, supra note 154, at 9. 
 194  Ronald W. Anderson & Karin Jõeveer, The Economics of Collateral 35 (Fin. Mkt 
Group, Discussion Paper No. 732, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2427231 (“[M]oving toward central clearing with product specialized CCPs can greatly 
increase the numbers of margin movements which will place greater demands on a 
participant’s operational capacity and liquidity.”). 
 195  For a discussion of this issue, see Elliot, supra note 186, at 10. 
 196  Matthias Arnsdorf, Central Counterparty Risk, 5 J. RISK MGMT. FIN. INSTITUTIONS 273, 
286 (2012); see also Joe Renison, Risk USA: Few Options to Manage CCP Exposure, Says 
RBS Chief Credit Officer, RISK MAG. (Oct. 23, 2013) (reporting that concerns by the Royal 
Bank of Scotland’s chief credit officer, Lesley Jones, that managing risks through a CCP, 
rather than bilaterally, exposes clearing members to more severe losses); Transcript of CFTC 
Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 89, at 72 (statement of Kristen 
Walters, BlackRock) (raising questions about “the actual estimate of potential loss to our 
clients in the instance of default”). 
 197  See, e.g., Rundle, supra note 153 (“Not surprisingly, clearing members are wanting 
more transparency on how clearing houses will operate in a crisis. Concerns are high that the 
stress-testing methodologies they use and the extent to which members might be required to 
prop up a clearer are ill-defined, to the point that it may increase risk in stressed markets.”). 
CCPs are not particularly sympathetic to this concern. See, e.g., Letter from Terrence A. 
Duffy, Executive Chairman & President, CME Group, Robert Druskin, Executive Chairman, 
Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., Scott A. Hill, Chief Financial Officer Int’l Exch., Inc., & 
Craig S. Donohue, Executive Chairman, Options Clearing Corp. to Jacob L. Lew, Chairman, 
Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ 
CME_DTCC_ICE_OCC_Letter.pdf (“With full transparency into a CCP’s financial 
safeguards and default management practices, clearing members and participants have 
sufficient information to evaluate the risk profile of the CCP and manage their own 
exposures.”). 
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capital, clearing member assessments, variation margin gain haircuts, or some other 
method. Also relevant to these risk assessments is how large a slice of default losses 
CCPs will bear and at what point in the waterfall.198 As will be discussed in the next 
section, however, if clearing members do not bear a sufficient portion of the tail risk, 
they will not adequately monitor their counterparties. 
C. Mandated Central Clearing Could Impair Counterparty Monitoring 
Clearing mandates may force some risks into CCPs that would be better handled 
through bilateral transactions. One of the main functions of a CCP is to eliminate the 
need for a buyer of a derivatives contract to monitor the seller and vice versa. Buyers 
and sellers planning to clear centrally can be indifferent about the identity of their 
counterparty.199 Although they will bear some risk to one another through the 
guaranty fund and potential for additional assessments or haircuts on non-defaulters, 
that exposure is diluted. As a consequence, less inter-dealer monitoring will take 
place than it did prior to the clearing mandate.200 Loss is mutualized and risk 
management is centralized at the CCP.  
CCPs have certain risk management advantages. They can monitor risk in a more 
holistic way from their central perch that comes with broad access to information.201 
CCPs have more information about a clearing member’s positions than a dealer in a 
bilateral market would have about another dealer’s positions. The CCP may also 
require clearing members to provide specified information and submit to 
monitoring.202 Pirrong has argued, however, that CCPs do not have information of as 
high quality as the hedge funds and banks that “specialize precisely in understanding 
risks and pricing . . . especially . . . for more complex and novel derivative 
instruments.”203 CCPs do not have access to the detailed market-specific knowledge 
                                                           
 198  See, e.g., BLACKROCK, CENTRAL CLEARING COUNTERPARTIES AND TOO BIG TO FAIL 3 
(2014) (“Having more skin in the game will incentivize the CCPs to at all times have robust 
risk management and would align incentives between the CCP, clearing members and market 
participants.”). But see Benoît Cœuré, Lecture, Ensuring an Adequate Loss-Absorbing 
Capacity of Central Counterparties, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 2015 
Symposium on Central Clearing (Apr. 10, 2015) (arguing that the primary responsibility for 
loss absorption should remain with clearing members, so they adequately monitor risks); 
LCH.CLEARNET, supra note 81, at 27 (“Skin in the game is not designed as a material 
component of loss absorption; its purpose is to align incentives of the CCP operator with those 
of the clearing members. Any requirement for the CCP operator to contribute significant 
additional resources to the default waterfall would fundamentally change the operator’s risk 
profile, creating increased risk exposure to member default at the very time that the market 
needs the operator to be resilient.”). 
 199  See, e.g., McPartland, supra note 67, at 2 (“In an electronic trading environment, 
clearing provides valuable anonymity; buyer and seller (and buying clearing member and 
selling clearing member) rarely know (or need to know) each other’s identity.”). 
 200  See, e.g., Roe, supra note 148, at 1694-95. 
 201  See, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 165, at 6 (“[P]erhaps the most important reason a CCP 
can reduce risk is that a CCP has a more complete picture of the aggregate risks posed by 
participants than do counterparties to uncleared transactions”). 
 202  See Hills et al., supra note 62, at 128. 
 203  Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice 14 (ISDA, 
Discussion Papers Series No. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing]. 
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possessed by dealers in the OTC markets. Even if they did, their ability to act on it is 
limited. Central clearing generally eliminates the counterparty-specific pricing that is 
possible in bilateral transactions.204 Whereas the amount of initial margin in a 
bilateral contract would likely depend on the counterparty, in central clearing, initial 
margin is typically not dependent on the creditworthiness of the counterparty.205  
Market participants might even employ their market-specific knowledge to 
strategically take on risks that they know will be offloaded to a CCP. Former British 
central banker Paul Tucker makes the point that “firms using a CCP have incentives 
to take more counterparty credit risk in their market transactions than otherwise, 
discriminating less when choosing with whom to trade because their credit exposure 
is not to their market counterparty but rather to the clearing house—unless the tail 
risk is credibly mutualized.”206 Efforts to increase the CCP’s “skin-in-the-game” in 
the event of a member default could exacerbate the problem of clearing members’ 
offloading risk—intentionally or carelessly—to CCPs.207 
Intra-industry monitoring was likely more intense with the old mutualized, self-
regulated model of clearinghouse ownership. Dealers in a particular product became 
members of the relevant CCP, managed the CCP, and—if a member ran into 
trouble—cooperatively managed the default and shared any losses. Members, 
therefore, had a strong interest in ensuring the rigor of the CCP’s membership 
criteria, the efficacy of its other risk management mechanisms, and the efficiency of 
its default management protocol. The standard current model for swaps CCPs, 
however, is a for-profit model in which the clearing members, who are not the sole 
owners and regulators, drive CCPs’ risk management decisions.208 CCPs that are not 
owned by members, but nevertheless allow members a significant voice in risk 
                                                           
 204  See, e.g., PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 6, at 10; Wibaut & Wilford, supra note 
148, at 114 (explaining that CCPs tend to “apply one-size-fits-all margin and trading fee 
policies irrespective of the end user’s credit quality”). 
 205  See, e.g., GREGORY, supra note 59, at 155 (“Initial margin depends primarily on the 
market risk of the centrally cleared trades and only a small component, if any, is linked to the 
credit quality of the clearing member.”). 
 206  Paul Tucker, Speech at the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Symposium: Are 
Clearinghouses the New Central Banks? (2014); see also Felix B. Chang, The Systemic Risk 
Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses Under Regulation, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 747, 773 
(2014) (“Lulled by a false sense of security and goaded by improvements in hedging from 
DCOs, players might take on more derivatives at greater notional values. Counterparties might 
monitor each other less, trusting that DCOs are doing so—whereas counterparties trading 
bilaterally likely understand each other better than a DCO would.”). 
 207  See, e.g., Cœuré, supra note 198 (“In fact, a substantial increase of ‘skin in the game’ 
could provide clearing members with a false sense of security, by reducing their potential 
contribution to the loss-allocation process. This could lead them to be less vigilant in 
monitoring risks, which may have severe consequences for the safety of CCPs . . . . [I]t seems 
reasonable that an increase in prefunded resources, should it become necessary, should be 
mainly borne by clearing members.”). 
 208  CME demutualized in 2000 and is a publicly held company that owns CCPs. CME 
Group Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 5 (2014), http://investor.cmegroup.com/investor-
relations/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1156375-14-12. Intercontinental Exchange, a publicly held 
company, owns ICE Clear Credit, which clears CDS. Id. LCH.Clearnet, a public company, 
owns CCPs, including LCH.Clearnet LLC, which clears OTC swaps. Id. at 2. 
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management, can properly align incentives, but the clearing mandate and related 
intense regulatory involvement in shaping risk management standards may make 
effective arrangements of this sort more difficult. 
For-profit CCPs can compete on the provision of effective and efficient risk 
management,209 which protects the clearing members from bearing losses should 
another member default, yet does not tie up unduly large amounts of capital. Credit 
rating agency Moody’s recently issued a proposed methodology for rating CCPs 
along these lines.210 More generally, the CPSS-IOSCO principles are intended to 
facilitate cross-CCP comparisons.211 Greater transparency by CCPs helps both direct 
and indirect clearing members to assess CCPs.212 The clearing mandate, however, 
makes it hard for a large financial firm to eschew doing business with a poorly 
managed CCP that clears a product subject to the mandate. In fact, firms may not 
invest much to monitor CCPs if they are effectively forced through legal mandates to 
deal with all major CCPs. Incentives to monitor CCPs and choose carefully which 
ones to use may be further hampered by Dodd-Frank’s practice of assigning the right 
to select a CCP to the non-dealer party to a transaction—the party with the least 
incentive to monitor the CCP.213 Further, as discussed below, the Dodd-Frank 
framework diminishes the role of financial firms in overseeing CCPs in favor of 
regulatory and public interest oversight. As a consequence, even if a dealer discovers 
a risk management problem at a CCP, it may not be able to get the CCP to address 
the problem.  
D. Mandated Clearing Could Force Improper Risks into CCPs 
Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate magnifies the complexity of CCPs’ already 
difficult task of managing risk. The clearing mandate, when combined with other 
regulatory and economic pressures, encourages CCPs to open their doors to products 
that are more difficult to clear than the products typically cleared in the past by 
CCPs. 
Table 2, which details the many issues confronting CCPs, illustrates the array of 
areas in which something could go wrong at a CCP—even one that does not clear 
OTC derivatives. As the CPSS-IOSCO report explained in modifying its central 
                                                           
 209  LCH.Clearnet, for example, highlights its risk management, including in its slogan 
“Trusted Risk Management for Cleared Markets.” See LCH.CLEARNET, supra note 81. 
 210  MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, PROPOSED CLEARING HOUSE RATING METHODOLOGY 
(2015), https://www.moodys.com/research/Proposed-Clearing-House-Rating-Methodology--
PBC_181095. Moody’s proposes to rate clearing houses according to a number of factors, 
including the way they plan for default, their competitive environment, the way they manage 
liquidity and counterparty risk, and availability of government and affiliate support. Id. at 5. 
 211  See supra Table 2. 
 212  See Cœuré, supra note 198 (arguing that greater transparency about CCP risks helps 
users of CCPs, especially “indirect members who, unlike direct members, do not play a direct 
role in the CCP's risk governance” to assess CCPs). 
 213  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 23.432 (2016) (requiring swap dealers and major swap 
participants to disclose “that the counterparty has the sole right to select the derivatives 
clearing organization at which the swap will be cleared”). The non-dealer’s clearing member 
presumably will monitor the CCP, but requiring that the non-dealer choose the CCP still 
removes the decision from the party with the most direct access to information about the CCP. 
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counterparty recommendations, “because of the complex risk characteristics and 
market design of OTC derivatives products, clearing them safely and efficiently 
through a CCP presents unique challenges that clearing listed or cash-market 
products may not.”214 The clearing mandate places a weighty thumb on the scale in 
favor of clearing that may cause regulators to overlook the “unique challenges” of 
clearing OTC derivatives.  
The clearing mandate, along with preexisting market pressure to clear 
standardized swaps, has been successful in increasing the use of CCPs after the 
crisis.215 ISDA reported that “[o]n average, more than 70% of interest rate 
derivatives and 80% of CDS index daily notional volume was cleared during the 
[first quarter of 2015].”216 The following Figure shows the increasing share of 
cleared outstanding swaps over the period from 2012 to 2015. 
 
Figure 5: Interest Rate Swaps and Credit Swaps Centrally Cleared 2012-2015217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 214  COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. 
COMM’NS, GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 2004 CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
OTC DERIVATIVES CCPS iii (2010), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD320.pdf [hereinafter CPSS/IOSCO GUIDANCE]. The document provides an 
extensive discussion of the unique complexities of an OTC derivative CCP. 
 215  Beylin has documented another interesting trend, namely that “the extent of swap activity 
within the U.S. by swap dealers has declined substantially . . . since the implementation of the 
clearing and platform execution mandates.” Beylin, supra note 5, at 17-23. 
 216  INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N., SWAPSINFO FIRST QUARTER REVIEW 1 (2015). 
 217  FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, FSOC 2015 ANNUAL REPORT DATA (2015), 
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Pages/2015-annual-report.aspx. Note: FSOC 
utilizes CFTC data. These are notional values. Data are adjusted for double-counting of 
cleared trades to show a single exposure for each trade. Methodology for collecting and 
reporting data changed in October 2013. 
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Some of these newly cleared swaps—particularly highly standardized interest 
rate swaps—are similar to futures and do not raise unique risk management 
concerns. Others may not meet the conditions for clearing: Highly standardized and 
liquid derivatives for which sufficient, reliable price data are available throughout 
the life of the contract. As Manmohan Singh warns, “pushing CCPs to clear riskier 
and less-liquid financial instruments, as the regulators are now demanding, may 
increase systemic risk and the probability of a bailout.”218 Single-name CDS 
contracts, for example, present a jump-to-default risk that makes them more difficult 
to properly margin than standard interest rate contracts.219 Some swaps may behave 
unremarkably during normal market conditions, but may be prone to unanticipated, 
dramatic price moves.220 Liquidity may fluctuate during a swap’s lifetime.221 Inter-
product correlations are also not constant over time.222 CCPs’ margin models—
developed for more standardized, highly liquid derivatives—may not properly 
accommodate the unique features of these newly cleared products and their 
correlations with other cleared products.223  
In deciding which products to clear and how to margin them, CCPs must be alert 
to other correlations as well. As CPSS-IOSCO highlighted, correlations among 
cleared products and clearing members are also important: 
[R]isk may be amplified due to a correlation among risk factors. For 
example, a CCP clearing CDS could experience a “double default” where 
a reference entity defaults and a CCP’s participant defaults 
simultaneously because the participant had a large short position (i.e. sold 
credit protections) in the reference entity or where the credit risk of a 
                                                           
 218  Singh, supra note 154, at 9; see also Gary Cohn, Clearing Houses Reduce Risk, They 
Do Not Eliminate It, FIN. TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/974c2c48-
16a5-11e5-b07f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz40fWse8Qi (setting forth argument by Goldman 
Sachs CEO and president that non-standardized products in deeply liquid markets can safely 
be cleared, but “in other markets, clearing houses can themselves become centres of 
concentrated risk and sources of contagion, amplifying systemic problems instead of 
alleviating them” and explaining that “[f]orcing central clearing on . . . complex, illiquid 
products that are susceptible to sudden and severe price gaps . . . can have serious 
repercussions.”). But see Squire, supra note 54, at 919 (arguing that, in order to increase 
netting opportunities, regulators should follow “the aphorism ‘in for a dime, in for a dollar’”). 
 219  CPSS/ IOSCO GUIDANCE, supra note 214, at 13 (“[S]ome products may have non-
linear risk characteristics (e.g. jump-to-default risk in a single-name CDS).”). 
 220  See, e.g., Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 172 (“[I]t will be important for CCPs to 
develop and enhance scenario-based stress-testing procedures which assess the impact of low 
probability, but nonetheless plausible events, which may have no precedent in the current 
historical record.”). 
 221  See, e.g., Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 18 (“[I]n many 
OTC products, liquidity tends to decline over time, and these positions are often retained for 
extended periods.”). 
 222  Wibaut & Wilford, supra note 148, at 112 (“[A]re unlikely to hold when it matters 
most—a systemic disruption with significant market contagion.”). 
 223  See, e.g., Knott & Mills, supra note 57, at 170 (“As CCPs expand into new markets, . . . 
there is a question about how effectively SPAN [a common margin methodology] can be 
adapted to deal with the more complex portfolios that result.”). 
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reference entity and that of a participant with a large short position are 
highly correlated. In another scenario, a defaulting participant with a short 
position may turn out to be the reference entity (self-referencing CDS).224  
Dodd-Frank acknowledges that the clearing mandate is not appropriate for all 
OTC derivatives. The statute directs the regulators, in deciding whether to impose a 
clearing mandate on a swap or group of swaps, to consider a number of factors 
including “the existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading 
liquidity, and adequate pricing data” along with operational and legal frameworks.225 
Based on these factors, regulators could choose not to impose a clearing mandate on 
particular swap categories. Other statutory factors—systemic risk mitigation and 
competitive implications226—however, seem to nudge regulators to opt for a clearing 
mandate, even if there are concerns about inadequate liquidity or pricing data. For 
example, in one clearing determination, the CFTC’s discussion of the systemic risk 
mitigation factor was conclusory—without any product-specific analysis, central 
clearing is simply presumed to mitigate systemic risk: 
Clearing the CDS indices subject to this determination will reduce 
systemic risk in the following ways: mitigating counterparty credit risk 
because the DCO would become the buyer to every seller of CDS indices 
subject to this determination and vice-versa; providing counterparties with 
daily mark-to-market valuations and exchange of variation margin 
pursuant to a risk management framework set by the DCO and reviewed 
by the Commission’s Division of Clearing and Risk; posting initial 
margin with the DCO in order to cover potential future exposures in the 
event of a default; achieving multilateral netting, which substantially 
reduces the number and notional amount of outstanding bilateral 
positions; reducing swap counterparties’ operational burden by 
consolidating collateral management and cash flows; and eliminating the 
need for novations or tear-ups because clearing members may offset 
opposing positions.227 
The analysis repeats the standard arguments for clearing without applying them 
specifically to the CDS indices allegedly being analyzed. Thus, although CFTC 
Chairman Timothy Massad acknowledged the non-universality of the clearing 
                                                           
 224  CPSS/ IOSCO GUIDANCE, supra note 214, at 13. 
 225  Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(2) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) (2012)). 
 226  Id. 
 227  Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 
74283 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39 & 50). 
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mandate in a recent speech,228 the regulatory penchant for clearing may color the 
exercise of that care.229 
Apart from the policymakers’ tendency to favor clearing, there are strong 
commercial, financial, and competitive incentives to extend clearing mandates to 
additional categories of swaps. These pressures come from CCPs seeking to expand 
their businesses230 and from market participants chafing under dealers’ control of the 
bilateral markets.231 Mandated central clearing brings with it new profit opportunities 
for firms that do not have large bank balance sheets and therefore were not attractive 
counterparties in the bilateral context.232 Expansive central clearing mandates also 
can appeal to a broader set of market participants attracted to the capital and margin 
savings of centrally cleared products. CCPs offer multilateral netting, which can 
reduce collateral demands.233  
                                                           
 228  Timothy G. Massad, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote 
Address Before the District of Columbia Bar (July 23, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/ 
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-26 (“We do not want to push all transactions into 
clearinghouses. There will always be some products that are not suitable for clearing because 
of their illiquidity or other risk characteristics. Clearinghouses will be stronger if we exercise 
care in what is centrally cleared.”). 
 229  See, e.g., Anu Munshi, CCPs—Too Big to Fail? The Danger of Concentration Risk, 
DERIVSOURCE (Jan. 13, 2012), http://derivsource.com/content/ccps-%E2%80%93-too-big-
fail-danger-concentration-risk (“Add to this the immense pressure from regulators and 
politicians for more derivatives to be cleared centrally and as soon as possible, when the CCPs 
are already working flat out on implementing a completely new way of operating for OTC 
derivatives.”). 
 230  See, e.g., Gillian Carr, CCPs Mull Equity Swaps Clearing Solutions, RISK.NET (Mar. 
20, 2015), http://www.risk.net/structured-products/news/2399385/ccps-mull-equity-swaps-
clearing-solutions (reporting that a number of CCPs are “exploring the possibility of clearing a 
broader range of equity swap products,” which could ultimately lead to new clearing 
mandates); Domanski et al., supra note 163, at 72 (“Most CCPs are for-profit entities—
typically vertically integrated with other financial market infrastructures, such as exchanges—
that are strongly motivated to generate revenues by expanding their product offering and 
capturing market share. However, new products could bring incremental risk, which clearing 
members may end up bearing if the CCP does not increase its capital commensurately.”). 
 231  See, e.g., Letter from Adam C. Cooper, Senior Managing Director and General 
Counsel, Citadel LLC, to David A. Stawick, Secretary, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
4 (Sept. 6, 2012) (“The Determination takes the decisive step, which the market has long 
anticipated and prepared for, of making mandatory central clearing of the most liquid and 
standardized swaps a reality . . . . We are confident that this transition will support and 
incentivize the progressive expansion of the cleared product set, since it will be more 
economically efficient for market participants to hold as much as possible of their portfolios in 
a single margined basket at a clearinghouse.”). 
 232  See, e.g., Katy Burne, Citadel Makes Inroads into Swaps Arena, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/citadel-makes-inroads-into-swaps-arena-1434997210 
(“Citadel Securities’ emergence as a big market maker in interest-rate swaps may draw other 
nonbank firms into what is seen as a potentially lucrative but technically challenging business, 
traders said.”). 
 233  As noted earlier, however, there may be an offsetting decrease in benefits from bilateral 
netting opportunities. 
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Regulatory advantages to clearing bolster the impetus for broad central clearing 
mandates. Among these advantages are potential margin savings compared to 
uncleared swaps. Dodd-Frank regulators are designing margin requirements on 
uncleared swaps to be more stringent than they would be in the cleared context.234 
Basel capital rules, which are being phased in, also offer favorable capital treatment 
for swaps cleared through a CCP that meets international standards—a qualifying 
CCP or “QCCP”.235 Uncleared OTC derivatives also carry a legal risk as Dodd-
Frank requires the SEC and CFTC to take steps to prevent “evasion of the mandatory 
clearing requirements.”236 Regulators, inclined to favor clearing, may paint broadly 
with the evasion brush. The legal risk of being classified as evasive likely will stifle 
bilaterally negotiated derivatives’ ability to play their important roles in facilitating 
risk management and fostering innovation.237 If designing a new way to manage a 
client’s risk invites regulatory scrutiny, dealers are likely instead to encourage clients 
to use homogenous, cleared products. Uncleared swaps already carry a stigma based 
on false crisis narratives,238 and the anti-evasion provisions reinforce this prejudice.  
                                                           
 234  See, e.g., Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major 
Swap Participants, 79 Fed. Reg. 59897 (proposed Oct. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 23 & 240) (“Given the Congressional reference to the ‘greater risk’ of uncleared swaps 
and the requirement that margin for such swaps ‘be appropriate for the risk,’ the Commission 
believes that establishing margin requirements for uncleared swaps that are at least as 
stringent as those for cleared swaps is necessary to fulfill the statutory mandate.”); see also 
Yellen, supra note 53, at 19-20 (“[A] more robust and consistent margin regime for non-
centrally cleared derivatives will not only reduce systemic risk, but will also diminish the 
incentive to tinker with contract language as a way to evade clearing requirements.”). 
 235  See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
BANK EXPOSURES TO CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES (2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs282.pdf. For a discussion of how capital rules apply to uncleared and cleared transactions, 
see, for example, Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, 
Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach 
for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced 
Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62017 
(Oct. 11, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 6, 165 & 167). 
 236  Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §2(h)(4) (2012)) (directing CFTC to 
prevent evasion of clearing mandate with respect to swaps); id. § 763(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c-3(d) (2012)) (directing SEC to prevent evasion of clearing mandate with respect to 
security-based swaps); see also FIN. STABILITY BD., IMPLEMENTING OTC DERIVATIVES 
MARKET REFORMS 21 (2010) (warning regulators to be wary of customization as a way to 
avoid clearing). 
 237  For a discussion of the important role that OTC derivatives have played in risk 
management and financial innovation, see POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES 
MARKET, supra note 76, at 9-10. 
 238  See, e.g., Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks 
Before the Institute of International Bankers Washington Conference: Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives Reform (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ 
opagensler-28 (“If we exempt a large class of transactions from clearing, we will leave 
significant risk on the books of derivatives dealers. This is the same risk that reverberated 
throughout the economy during the financial crisis.”). 
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E. Regulatory Conflicts of Interest Could Impair CCP Risk Management 
CCPs, as originally conceived, brought together a group of members, which 
voluntarily pooled and cooperatively managed risks. In the new model, voluntary 
cooperative efforts are being replaced by regulatory mandates.239 Not only does the 
Dodd-Frank regulatory structure force new risks into CCPs, it makes it more 
difficult for CCPs to manage those risks. Because of the important place CCPs have 
in the government-made OTC market structure and the at least implicit government 
backstop, many policymakers and academics call for intense regulation of CCPs.240 
As regulators take a greater interest in CCP risk management, their instinctively pro-
clearing mindset could undermine CCP risk management. 
As the CPSS-IOSCO standards laid out in Table 2 show, CCPs must make many 
operational and risk management determinations including deciding what to clear, 
setting membership standards, designing and using proper margin methodologies, 
managing operational risk, properly funding the guaranty fund, and carefully 
managing defaults. CCPs also have to make wise operational and technical 
decisions. The sum of these determinations affects whether a CCP will support or 
undermine the stability of the financial system. Many of these decisions require 
sophisticated modeling and complicated trade-offs with implications for CCP risk.241 
Regulators are typically viewed as having an important role to play in making key 
                                                           
 239  As is evident from housing policy, bank capital requirements, credit ratings, and other 
areas in which the government has involved itself in assessing and managing risk, regulators’ 
influence on these decisions can serve to undermine financial stability. See, e.g., ARNOLD 
KLING, NOT WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND: A HISTORY OF POLICIES THAT PRODUCED THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 (2009) (demonstrating role “that broad policy areas—including 
housing policy, capital regulations for banks, industry structure and competition, autonomous 
financial innovation, and monetary policy” played in bringing about the financial crisis); 
PETER WALLISON, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE WORLD’S WORST 
CRISIS AND WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN (2015) (discussing the role of failed government 
housing policy in the crisis). 
 240  See, e.g., Massad, supra note 228 (underscoring the importance of CCP regulation 
“because of the increased importance we have placed on central clearing”); see also Allen, 
supra note 153, at 1106 (calling for strict regulation and a pre-funded guaranty fund with a 
government backstop); Bernanke, supra note 56 (explaining that a robust prudential 
regulatory regime must accompany access to emergency credit facilities); Powell, supra note 
169 (explaining that international CCP standards are “essential given that, in the interest of 
transparency and improved risk management, policymakers have encouraged the 
concentration of activities at these key nodes”); Tucker, supra note 206, at 12 (explaining that 
“[l]ike central banks, clearing houses are part of the essential financial plumbing of modern 
economies,” former UK central bank official Paul Tucker argues that CCPs should be 
macroprudentially “regulated utilities”). But see Levitin, supra note 64, at 462-63 (identifying 
a potential role for regulation of CCP rules, but arguing principally for high capital standards 
to serve as a “financial sea wall” for CCPs). 
 241  See, e.g., IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, 18 (noting that “a 
CCP that relies on a lower margining and a high guarantee fund may contribute to moral 
hazard by encouraging some [clearing members] to take higher risks, since their losses are 
mutualized among all [clearing members, while on] the other hand, higher margining and a 
lower guarantee fund reduces [clearing members’] potential exposures to other [clearing 
members] and may dilute their interest in ensuring that the CCP manages its risks robustly.”). 
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risk-management decisions,242 but their involvement in these decisions may not 
improve CCP safety.243  
The combination of complex risk management questions and the important role 
that CCPs play in the broader financial system naturally invites close regulatory 
scrutiny. The clearing mandate, however, diverts regulators’ focus from risk 
management to incentivizing central clearing. Regulators have acknowledged that 
tensions exist.244 Giving risk management considerations their proper place will 
continue to be difficult for regulators eager to increase central clearing and keen to 
mitigate the competitive effects and costs associated with the clearing mandate. 
First, regulators may be moved by factors other than risk management in setting 
membership rules. A firm that does not qualify or choose to be a CCP member must 
clear through a member (or through a member’s client) or forgo trading in swaps 
subject to a clearing mandate.245 The SEC and CFTC have established membership 
requirements for CCPs, including a $50 million minimum for member capital.246 The 
                                                           
 242  See, e.g., Agostino Capponi & W. Allen Cheng, Incentives Behind Clearinghouse 
Requirements 3 (2015), (unpublished manuscript) (concluding, in the context of setting 
margin, that “[d]epending on the prevailing equilibrium, regulation may be necessary for 
protecting the clearinghouse against default losses”). 
 243  See, e.g., Wibaut & Wilford, supra note 148 (describing the many pitfalls regulators 
face in designing or influencing the design of the CCP landscape). 
 244  See, e.g., Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract 
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 
Fed. Reg. 63732 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39 & 40) 
[hereinafter CFTC Conflicts Proposal] (“[I]t is important to mitigate potential conflicts of 
interest that may prevent clearable swap contracts from becoming subject to mandatory 
clearing. At the same time, the Commission recognizes that the safety and soundness of a 
DCO should not be compromised. A DCO must not only have the ability to appropriately 
manage the risk associated with each and every contract that it guarantees, it must be able to 
decline accepting contracts for clearing if they pose unacceptable risks. In addition, DCO 
members must have input in setting membership criteria, because they bear the risk of loss in 
the event of member default.”). 
 245  See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 71, at 16-17 (observing that the clearing mandate 
could effectively shut certain parties out of OTC markets subject to a mandate if they are 
neither eligible to be members nor desirable clients for a member); see also Clearing Agency 
Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66240 (“[T]he success of correspondent clearing arrangements 
depends on the willingness of participants to enter such arrangements with non-participant 
firms that may act as direct competitors to the participants in the participants’ capacity as 
dealers or security-based swap dealers in the market for the relevant securities.”). 
 246  See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 69333, 69356 (Nov. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39) (“The Commission does 
not believe that the $50 million threshold would lead to a DCO having to admit clearing 
members that are unable to participate in the default management process. As discussed 
above, the regulation does not preclude highly-capitalized entities (such as swap dealers) from 
participating in a DCO as clearing members. Thus, the addition of smaller clearing members 
does not eliminate the role that larger clearing members can play in default management—it 
merely spreads the risk.”); Clearing Agency Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66242 (“[W]e believe 
that persons that maintain a net capital level of equal to or greater than $50 million, as well as 
an appropriate level of financial expertise, should not be denied participation in a CCP based 
solely on their net capital levels, provided that such persons are able to comply with other 
reasonable membership standards.”). 
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CFTC, in its rule governing DCO membership requirements, struggled to navigate 
the line between risk-management and open-access. The CFTC claims to entrust 
DCOs “with discretion to balance restrictions on participation with legitimate risk 
management concerns” because they are “in the best position in the first instance to 
determine the optimal balance.”247 Yet it specifically prohibits DCOs from “sett[ing] 
a limit on the number of market participants that may become clearing members,”248 
setting more than a $50 million minimum capital requirement for membership,249 and 
“requir[ing] members to post a minimum amount of liquid margin or default 
guarantee contributions, or to participate in a liquidity facility.”250 These decisions 
support open CCP access, but may interfere with legitimate CCP risk management.  
There are reasons for favoring broad, diverse membership. Clearing proponents 
such as Professor Greenberger hope that a broader, more diverse membership will 
“foster long-term stability” and pay off in the event of a default “by distributing the 
costs of default across a greater number of members.”251 On the other hand, 
observers such as Professor Pirrong argue that homogeneous membership generates 
more stable CCPs.252 Broadening CCP membership raises concerns, including the 
possibility that the new members will not be operationally able to participate in the 
wind-down of a defaulting member’s portfolio or financially able to participate in 
default management auctions.253 
                                                           
 247  Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 69356. 
 248  Id. 
 249  Id. at 69355. The CFTC argued that “the addition of smaller clearing members does not 
eliminate the role that larger clearing members can play in default management—it merely 
spreads the risk” and that “[s]ubject to appropriate safeguards, outsourcing of certain 
obligations can be an effective means of harmonizing these goals.” Id. at 69356. Query 
whether these outsourcing arrangements would be honored during a crisis when they would 
most likely be called upon. The SEC also employs a $50 million net capital membership 
threshold, but “recognizes the benefit of maintaining flexibility to allow a CCP to impose 
higher net capital requirements in circumstances where that is necessary to mitigate risks that 
could not otherwise be effectively managed by other measures.” Clearing Agency Standards, 
77 Fed. Reg. at 66243. 
 250  Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 69357. 
 251  See Greenberger, supra note 52, at 256-57; see also Ed Nosal, Clearing Over-the-
Counter Derivatives, 35 ECON. PERSP. 137, 144 (2010) (arguing that broad membership 
fosters liquidity and competition, so any firm that “can cover the risk that it brings into the 
CCP, by providing appropriate levels of collateral and making contributions to the guarantee 
fund” should be allowed membership”). 
 252  See, e.g., Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 27 (“CCPs with 
more diverse memberships are more prone to conflict, more cumbersome to manage, less 
effective at responding to changes in the marketplace, and less effective at responding to 
crises that are likely to have disparate impacts on different types of firms” and are more 
vulnerable to “moral hazard problems”). 
 253  See, e.g., Default Management Process, EUREX CLEARING, http://www.eurexclearing.com/ 
clearing-en/risk-management/default-management-process (last visited Mar. 16, 2016); CHI. 
MERCANTILE EXCH., RULEBOOK, supra note 68, at Rule 8F025 (explaining that traders employed by 
certain clearing members will be called upon to advise on hedging, liquidating, and transferring a 
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Membership quality has traditionally been a key risk management feature of 
CCPs. Angela Armakola and Jean-Paul Laurent underscore the important 
relationship between CCP resilience in the face of stress scenarios and the strength 
of a CCP’s member base.254 They urge regulators to be “cautious about . . . [the] 
subsidizing of low quality [clearing members] that might overload a CCP at the 
expense of others, thus jeopardizing the efficiency of the new risk-sharing 
mechanisms.”255 They suggest that CCPs consider using “default fund add-ons for 
members with decreasing credit quality”256—a feature that runs counter to 
regulators’ open-access theme. Professor Jo Braithwaite refers to this as “the 
membership dilemma” created by “regulators having framed compulsory legislation 
around a private sector legal device designed to mutualise losses for selected 
participants.”257 As Professor Hal Scott explains, “[a] clearinghouse is just an 
association, so it’s only as strong as the member firms. If you were hell-bent on 
fairness, and opened this thing to everybody, that would increase the risk to the 
clearinghouse.”258 A United Kingdom financial regulator urged the CFTC to be 
careful not to err on the side of excessively lax membership requirements: 
Participation requirements sometimes need to be tailored to take into 
account the types of products being cleared by a CCP. For example the 
less liquid derivative markets typically require more complex default 
management processes that impose more onerous obligations on the 
participants than the exchange traded futures market. The ability of the 
surviving clearing members to meet their obligations in relation to default 
management is important in mitigating systemic risk in the event of a 
clearing member default.259 
Second, the mandated use of CCPs has given them a quasi-public character in 
regulators’ eyes, which complicates CCP governance by introducing competing 
                                                           
defaulting member’s portfolio). For a brief discussion of the role played by nondefaulting members 
when a member defaults, see Cecile Sourbes, CCPs Confront the Difficult Maths of Default 
Management, RISK.NET (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2391889/ccps-
confront-the-difficult-maths-of-default-management (using the example of LCH.Clearnet’s handling 
of the Lehman default in 2008 to explain the role that clearing members play when another member 
defaults). CCPs may punish members that do not participate in good faith in the auction process by 
making their contributions to the guarantee fund the first to be tapped to meet a post-auction shortfall. 
See id. 
 254  See Angela Armakola & Jean-Paul Laurent, CCP Resilience and Clearing Membership 
(Nov. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID2693427_code1859873.pdf?abstractid=2625579&mirid=1. 
 255  Id. at 26. 
 256  Id.  
 257  Braithwaite, supra note 71, at 12. 
 258  Q&A with Hal Scott of Harvard Law: Clearinghouse Ownership and Risk, 
TRADEWEB.COM (Oct. 20. 2010), http://www.tradeweb.com/Blog/Q-A-With-Hal-Scott-of-
Harvard-Law--Clearinghouse-Ownership-and-Risk. 
 259  Letter from Alexander Justham, Director, Market Division, Fin. Servs. Authority, to 
David A. Stawick, Secretary, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 2 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
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interests.260 Heritage Foundation scholar Norbert Michel points out that Dodd-
Frank’s classification of CCPs as financial market utilities “marks a dangerous shift 
in the relationship between government and private markets because it implies that 
private financial firms cannot—or should not—competitively provide financial 
services.”261 The CPSS/IOSCO principles, which heavily inform U.S. regulation, 
emphasize the responsibility of financial market infrastructures to “support the 
stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, 
and the objectives of relevant stakeholders,”262 and call for governance to balance the 
interests of a CCP’s owners, board of directors, managers, clearing members, 
regulators, and “other stakeholders.”263 Directing CCPs—in the nebulous name of 
public interest—to serve multiple constituencies with potentially conflicting 
objectives may have the perverse effect of destabilizing CCPs and the financial 
system. CCPs that are run with a member-focus are more likely to elevate risk 
management than CCPs required to consider a host of other constituencies (such as 
regulators and other non-member “stakeholders”), who do not face the prospect of 
absorbing CCP losses.  
Third, regulators face pressure to view risk management measures as the product 
of competitive machinations by dealers. In a comment letter to the CFTC, for 
example, the Department of Justice argued that anti-competitive behavior in 
connection with CCP access “could be explained away . . . by expressing risk 
management-related concerns” and urged the CFTC to adopt stricter conflict of 
interest standards for CCPs.264 This view may inform regulators’ decisions to 
disallow particular risk management measures. It also helps to drive calls for 
governance and ownership restrictions on CCPs.  
                                                           
 260  Both the SEC and CFTC have proposed—but not adopted—ownership and governance 
rules. See Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract 
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 
Fed. Reg. 63732 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 37, 38, 39 & 40); 
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing 
Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges with 
Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65882 (proposed Oct. 
26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) [hereinafter SEC Conflicts Proposal]. 
 261  Michel, supra note 118, at 10. 
 262  CPSS/IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 1. 
 263  Id. at 26. 
 264  Department of Justice, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Requirements for 
Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution 
Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest (Dec. 28, 2010), 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26809 [hereinafter DOJ 
Comment Letter]; see also Chang, supra note 56, at 810-12 (arguing that “because big banks, 
which tend to be the powerhouse derivatives dealers, control clearinghouses, there is a danger 
that big banks can leverage the dominance of clearinghouses to consolidate their share in the 
dealer market” and arguing for the application of the “essential facilities doctrine” for the 
purpose of “clarifying when rivals of clearinghouse members might be able to pursue a private 
right of action”) (footnote omitted); Kristin N. Johnson, Clearinghouse Governance: Moving 
Beyond Cosmetic Reform, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681, 696-701 (2012) (arguing that large 
dealer CCP members’ “rent-seeking motives” could lead CCPs to make decisions that 
undermine the role of CCPs in risk mitigation). 
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Many observers favor replacing dealer influence in governance and risk 
management with public interest and regulatory representation. Professor 
Greenberger has called for at least half of directors to be independent.265 Professor 
Kristin Johnson, pointing to the “conflict between regulators’ expectations and . . . 
clearinghouse owners’ priorities,”266 calls for a regulator-appointed monitor to serve 
as a board watchdog who “would report directly to and receive compensation from” 
regulators.267 Johnson also calls for expert directors without “material financial ties” 
to serve on powerful risk management committees.268 The Department of Justice has 
called for the risk management committee to be populated with a majority of 
independent directors.269 Better Markets likewise advocates that a CCP’s risk 
management committee “be controlled in form and substance by independent 
decision-makers.”270 Under Dodd-Frank’s conflict of interest mandates, the SEC and 
CFTC have contemplated individual and aggregate ownership caps and independent 
director involvement in governance to temper clearing member influence.271 
                                                           
 265  See Greenberger, supra note 52, at 265. 
 266  Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. 
REV. 185, 221 (2013). 
 267  Id. at 240. 
 268  Id. at 206-07. 
 269  DOJ Comment Letter, supra note 264, at 7. 
 270  Better Markets, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Requirements for Derivatives 
Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the 
Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest (Nov. 17, 2010), http://bettermarkets.com/sites/default/ 
files/documents/CFTC-%20CL-%20Conflicts%20of%20Interest%20SEFs%2C%20DCOs%2011-
17-10.pdf. 
 271  The SEC proposed two alternatives: (1) CCP member ownership interest and voting 
rights are capped individually at twenty percent and in the aggregate at forty percent; and at 
least thirty-five percent of the board of directors and committees must be directors who are 
independent of the CCP and its members, except for the nominating committee, which must 
have a majority of independent directors; and (2) CCP member ownership and voting rights 
are capped at five percent, a majority of all directors are independent, all members of the 
nominating committee are independent, and all other committees are majority independent. 
Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing 
Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges with 
Respect to Security-Based Swaps under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65882, 65894-5902 
(proposed Oct. 26, 2010). The CFTC also proposed two alternatives: (1) CCP members’ and 
other large financial institutions’ voting equity is capped at twenty percent individually and 
forty percent in the aggregate; and (2) CCP members’ and other large financial entities’ voting 
equity is capped at 5 percent. Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of 
Conflicts of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63732, 63738, 63743-44 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010). The 
CFTC also proposed to require that thirty-five percent, and no fewer than two, of the directors 
be “public” directors. Id. at 63738. The nominating committee would have to have at least 
fifty-one percent public directors, one of whom would have to be chairman. Thirty-five 
percent of the risk management committee members would have to be public directors, and 
ten percent would have to be customers of clearing members. Id. at 63740. For a helpful 
summary and an insightful analysis of these proposals, see Sean J. Griffith, Governing 
Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY 
L.J. 1153, 1212-26 (2012). 
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Professor Sean Griffith acknowledges that “dealers must exert a level of control over 
clearinghouse operations that is commensurate with their exposure to risk through 
the clearinghouse,” but advocates that CCP boards include some directors elected by 
regulators to ensure systemic risk considerations are taken into account.272 Concerns 
about dealer control of CCPs are understandable in light of their increasing 
importance, but attempts to readjust the power dynamics at CCPs may 
unintentionally destabilize them. 
Fourth, regulators, faced with the expansion of CCPs, may be tempted to employ 
one-size-fits-all regulations that distract CCPs from conducting their own tailored 
risk management. Stress tests are one area in which this concern has arisen. CFTC 
Commissioner Wetjen, although calling for “[m]ore standardized stress tests” across 
jurisdictions,273 warned that “[w]hile standardization and uniformity are appealing, 
they could inadvertently impede innovation and thoroughness. Would we start to 
teach to the test instead of evaluating and refining the stress test methodologies as 
appropriate?”274 
Fifth, a prescriptive regulatory regime applicable to a small number of firms with 
a vital role in the financial system seems fertile ground for regulatory capture.275 
Economist George Stigler warned that, “as a rule, regulation is acquired by industry 
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”276 There are a small number 
of CCPs and Dodd-Frank legally mandates that they be used. There are also 
relatively few large firms that serve as clearing members. Although the new 
regulatory framework is burdensome for both sets of firms, they could seek to use 
these burdens to their advantage in blocking entry by domestic and foreign rivals. 
Alternatively, as the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee suggested, CCPs 
could “exploit opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and regulatory capture to lessen 
the costs of government oversight.”277 Moreover, CCPs are likely to put pressure on 
                                                           
 272  Id. at 1221, 1235-40. 
 273  Mark P. Wetjen, Commissioner, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, Ensuring 
the Promise of a Centrally Cleared, Glob. Swaps Mkt.: Next Steps (Dec. 4, 2014); see also 
David Bailey, The Bank of England’s Perspective on CCP Risk Management, Recovery and 
Resolution Arrangements, Speech at the Deutsche Boerse Group and Eurex Exchange of Ideas 
Conference (Nov. 24, 2014) (calling for “[s]tandardised stress tests” to “complement more 
tailored and potentially much more rigorous internal stress testing, developed and 
implemented by individual CCPs”); Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors, 
A Financial System Perspective on Central Clearing of Derivatives (Nov. 6, 2014) (“Not all 
CCPs are alike. But there may be approaches that could bring some of the benefits of 
standardization while allowing tailoring of some scenarios to the activities of particular CCPs 
or groups of CCPs.”). 
 274  Wetjen, supra note 273. 
 275  I credit an anonymous peer reviewer for raising this concern. A full analysis of 
regulatory capture in the post-Dodd-Frank derivatives markets is beyond the scope of this 
piece, but would be a productive area for further research. 
 276  George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 
(1971). 
 277  Edward Kane, Statement of the Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm. on The Dangers of 
Substituting Foreign Compliance for US Supervision of Fin Derivatives Activity (May 13, 
2013), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/-statement-no-340-the-dangers-of-
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regulators to dissuade the use of non-cleared derivatives, which can serve as 
substitutes for cleared products. The authority of multiple regulators in this space 
might have the salutary effect of impeding regulatory capture, but divided regulatory 
authority brings its own challenges. 
Sixth, conflicts among regulators could exacerbate CCP risk by adding 
complexity to CCP management. The SEC and CFTC directly regulate CCPs and the 
Federal Reserve plays a back-up role under Title VIII of Dodd-Frank. The 
approaches taken by these agencies are not always consistent, in part because of the 
historical differences in the way the agencies oversaw CCPs.278 There have also been 
calls for the involvement of the FSOC in CCP regulation.279 Moreover, because OTC 
derivatives markets operate across borders, cooperation among international 
regulators of CCPs is important. Relations between U.S. regulators and their foreign 
counterparts were strained from the outset, because Dodd-Frank requires foreign 
regulators to indemnify the CFTC if they obtain information from the commissions 
about CCPs.280 Despite the common G-20 commitment to central clearing, regulators 
have taken a strongly territorial approach to CCPs.281 As challenging as these 
regulatory disagreements are to CCPs routinely, they could cause severe difficulties 
during a crisis as regulators fight to keep assets in CCPs within their jurisdiction.282 
                                                           
substituting-foreign-compliance-for-us-supervision-of-financial-derivatives-
activity_131454985226.pdf. 
 278  See, e.g., CFTC & SEC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON 
HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION 88 (2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/ 
cftcjointreport101609.pdf (“The CFTC does not have clear authority, for example, to set rules 
for risk management for exchanges and clearinghouses. The CFTC’s authority contrasts with 
the authority of other regulators, such as the SEC or regulators in foreign jurisdictions.”). 
 279  See Letter from Paul Saltzman, President, Clearing House Association, LLC, to Jacob 
Lew, Chairman, Financial Stability Oversight Council (Jan. 9, 2015) (“[T]he FSOC [should] 
coordinate and work with its member agencies with authority over CCPs to strengthen the 
ability of CCPs to mitigate and manage systemic risks arising from CCP operations.”). But see 
Letter from Terrence A. Duffy et al., Executive Chairman and President, CME Group, to 
Jacob L. Lew, Chairman, Financial Stability Oversight Council (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.optionsclearing.com/components/docs/about/press/comment-letters/20150309-
FSOC.pdf (arguing against the one-size-fits-all regulation that might be introduced by active 
FSOC involvement in CCP regulatory issues). 
 280  Dodd-Frank Act § 725(e) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(k)(5) (2012)). 
 281  See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 37, at 11 (“In the majority of cases, CCPs are 
authorized to clear products in a given asset class in only one or two jurisdictions. Only in the 
case of interest rate derivatives are there a couple of CCPs that are concurrently authorised in 
four or more jurisdictions. The limited extent of cross-border availability of CCPs is a 
potential challenge for the further expansion of central clearing of OTC derivatives, given that 
most jurisdictions require that a given CCP be locally authorised if it is to be used for meeting 
that jurisdiction’s central clearing requirements.”). 
 282  See, e.g., Wendt, supra note 167, at 12 (“International coordination among authorities 
will be challenging, in case of a default impacting multiple jurisdictions, as interests may 
differ. The home authority may give priority to maintaining the CCP’s operations, whereas the 
authorities of other countries may prioritize the stability of their financial system or local 
banks.”); see also Kay Swinburne, Member of the European Parliament, Speech Before the 
World Federation of Exchanges/IOMA Conference (May 5, 2015), 
http://www.kayswinburne.co.uk/articles/SpeechWFEIOMA050515/559 (“[I do not] want to 
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As clearing mandates take hold around the world, the pressure for linkages among 
CCPs is likely to grow,283 which will only further complicate regulatory oversight.  
Finally, the desire to increase the proportion of cleared swaps is likely to affect 
regulators’ oversight of key risk management decisions. Decisions related to 
margin—methods used to determine how much is collected, the form margin may 
take, and how it is invested—are one area in which regulators’ perspectives could be 
colored by their excessively pro-clearing bent. If margins are set improperly, the 
CCP may be at risk.284 Regulatory pressure may reinforce competitive pressures; if 
margins are set too high, market participants may seek out other CCPs.285 
Alternatively, firms might retain risks instead of entering into highly margined 
derivatives transactions. As Paul Tucker argues, CCPs may have a natural inclination 
to behave pro-cyclically by “shading margins to the downside during normal times 
to help sustain market growth or market share, and tightening sharply as and when 
conditions deteriorate.”286 Market participants may urge regulators to pressure CCPs 
to keep margins down, and regulators may assent to retain broad support for 
clearing. Margining methodologies are complex and model-based,287 and how best to 
set margins is matter of great debate among academics288 and regulators.289 Because 
                                                           
see a scenario where the banking regulator of a large clearing member refuses to allow that 
member to participate in refills of a CCPs default fund as it is concerned about that bank 
having enough capital to refill one of its own domestically supervised CCPs”). 
 283  Linking can take different forms. See, e.g., IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORT, supra note 30, at 114. 
 284  See id. at 108 (discussing CCP failures and highlighting the role that failure to properly 
increase margin requirements played in the failures of the French Caisse de Liquidation, the 
Malaysian Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House, and the Hong Kong Futures 
Exchange). 
 285  See, e.g., Nicole Abruzzo & Yang-Ho Park, An Empirical Analysis of Futures Margin 
Changes: Determinants and Policy Implications 24 (Fed. Res. Bd. Fin. and Econ. Discussion 
Paper No. 2014-86, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/ 
files/201486pap.pdf (finding “that margin changes can be partly explained by competition 
even after changes in other margin determinants are controlled for” and that “competition 
among CCPs can make overall margin requirements inappropriately lax”). They also note that 
CCPs can compete not only based on margin levels, but “in terms of acceptable collateral, 
haircut rates, or guaranty fund contributions.” Id. at 25. 
 286  Tucker, supra note 206. 
 287  For a glimpse into margin-setting methodologies, see ICE CLEAR CREDIT, ICE CDS 
MARGIN CALCULATOR ICE LINK GUI (Aug. 2014), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ 
clear_credit/ICE_CDS_Margin_Calculator_Presentation.pdf. 
 288  Trade-offs in setting margin or collateral arise in both the cleared and uncleared 
contexts. A full discussion of these trade-offs is beyond the scope of this article, but these 
issues have been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Rajna Gibson Brandon & Carsten Murawski, 
Margining in the Derivatives Markets and the Stability of the Banking Sector, 37 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 1119 (2013). CCPs face some unique issues in margin-setting. See, e.g., Thorsten V. 
Koeppl, Time for Stability in Derivatives Markets—A New Look at Central Clearing for 
Securities Markets, C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENTARY, No. 329, May 2011, at 20 (“Collateral 
can basically serve two functions: as an incentive device to decrease risk-taking or as an 
insurance device against counterparty default. A CCP can save on collateral since it provides 
cheaper insurance in the form of novation and mutualization of losses. But a CCP needs to 
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there is not a widely accepted formula for setting margin, there is a lot of room for 
non-risk considerations to affect regulators’ views on margin methodologies. Wibaut 
and Wilford point out, for example, that regulators’ role in setting the type of margin 
that CCPs can accept could be influenced by the same forces that drove regulators to 
treat German and Greek bonds as equivalent.290 Consequences of regulatory mistakes 
may not manifest themselves until a crisis. 
Another example where the desire to move swaps into CCPs may color 
regulators’ view of key risk management issues is what, if any, role a CCP’s own 
capital should play in absorbing losses from member defaults and how CCP 
resolution should be handled. On the one hand, members argue that CCPs must face 
consequences from member defaults so that they can take adequate measures to 
prevent them from happening.291 On the other hand, CCPs are likely to resist having 
regulators mandate contributions by CCPs.292 Regulators are likely to look for the 
approach that imposes the least additional immediate cost on clearing services, even 
if that approach does not reflect the allocation of risk most conducive to sound risk 
management. To keep clearing cheap, regulators may tolerate large uncovered risks 
with the expectation that taxpayers will bear losses when the crisis comes. This 
temptation leads to a final problem—the specter of a future government bailout. 
F. Bailout Risk 
In an era of clearing mandates, a shuttered CCP could devastate markets as 
market participants must centrally clear transactions subject to the clearing mandate. 
If the CCP shut down, market participants would not be able to transact in products 
subject to the clearing mandate unless there were a competing CCP clearing those 
products. Clearing members and their regulators therefore will have a strong interest 
in keeping a CCP that has gotten to the end of its default waterfall up and running.293 
                                                           
rely more heavily on collateral to limit incentives for risk-taking. Hence, collateral 
requirements might very well increase significantly with CCP clearing as pointed out by some 
large dealers.”). 
 289  See, e.g., Verena Ross, Exec. Dir., European Securities and Markets Authority, 
Keynote Speech at IDX 2015 (June 9, 2015) (arguing that the CFTC’s proposed one-day 
margin period of risk for clearing members’ accounts is insufficient to protect CCPs and their 
nondefaulting members if a member defaults); Timothy G. Massad, Chairman, Remarks 
Before the European Union Parliament, Committee on Economics (May 6, 2015), 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/opamass
ad-20.pdf (arguing that CFTC’s one-day margining approach may actually lead to higher 
margin than Europe’s two-day margin period because the CFTC does not allow netting of 
customer margin as European regulators do); see also Cecile Sourbes & Kris Devasabai, 
Regulators to Put CCP Risks Under Microscope, RISK.NET (May 7, 2015) (“[CCP] [m]argin 
models have long been a source of controversy.”). 
 290  Wibaut & Wilford, supra note 148, at 108 n.7. 
 291  See Letter from Paul Saltzman to Jacob Lew, supra note 279. 
 292  Letter from Terrence A. Duffy to Jacob L. Lew, supra note 279 (“Although our CCPs 
have very different default management waterfalls, we all agree that because CCPs are not 
principal risk-taking institutions and because their continuation as institutions depends upon 
effective risk management and default management programs, there is no ‘moral hazard’ to be 
cured by mandating a specific or uniform approach to CCP contributions.”).  
 293  See supra Table 1. 
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Demands for contributions to resuscitate a failing CCP, however, are likely to come 
at a time of market stress, when clearing members are facing many other claims on 
their assets, particularly their liquid assets.  
If clearing members could not prop up a CCP, presumably the government that 
imposes the clearing mandate and supervises CCPs would go to great lengths to keep 
them in operation. A CCP failure would reflect badly on CCP’s regulators.294 The 
potential availability of government support for a failing CCP is reflected in Dodd-
Frank in two ways. First, Dodd-Frank’s drafters did not seem to expect that CCPs 
would be eligible for the orderly liquidation authority in Title II of Dodd-Frank. The 
orderly liquidation authority, a centerpiece of Dodd-Frank, is an alternative to 
bankruptcy for resolving large financial institutions. Whether a CCP could be 
resolved under Title II is at best ambiguous. Title II does not explicitly cover CCPs. 
Professor Lubben convincingly argues that both the language and logic of Title II 
exclude CCPs from its reach.295  
The second way is in authority given to the Federal Reserve. Title VIII gives the 
Federal Reserve the authority to loan money through the discount window to 
systemically important CCPs in “unusual or exigent circumstances.”296 Dodd-Frank 
also allows the Federal Reserve to establish accounts for systemically important 
CCPs and provide services to them such as currency and coin services, check 
clearing and collection services, wire transfer services, automated clearinghouse 
services, settlement services, securities safekeeping services, and Federal Reserve 
                                                           
 294  Kane, supra note 277. 
 295  Stephen J. Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank’s Fatal Flaw?, 23-24 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID2652011_code108302.pdf?abstractid=2652011&mirid=1 [hereinafter Lubben, 
Failure of the Clearinghouse] (arguing that CCPs likely are not encompassed in the list of 
companies that can proceed through resolution and that, had CCPs been intended to be 
covered, the CFTC would have been granted a role in deciding whether a CCP should be put 
into the orderly liquidation authority); see also Darrell Duffie, Financial Market 
Infrastructure: Too Important to Fail 3 (Hoover Inst. Econ. Working Paper No. 14101, 2014) 
(discussing questions about whether Title II, particularly as interpreted by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, applies to CCPs ). Julia Allen has come to a different legal conclusion 
about the applicability of Title II to CCPs, but argues that “[T]he logistical complexities of 
applying the Orderly Liquidation Authority procedures to an insolvent clearinghouse make 
government intervention before initiation of the receivership process the most likely 
outcome.” Allen, supra note 153, at 1103. 
 296  Dodd-Frank Act § 806(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2012)) (“The Board of 
Governors may authorize a Federal Reserve Bank . . . to provide a designated financial market 
utility discount and borrowing privileges only in unusual or exigent circumstances, upon the 
affirmative vote of a majority of the Board of Governors . . . after consultation with the 
Secretary, and upon a showing by the designated financial market utility that it is unable to 
secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.”); see also Baker, 
supra note 152, at 180 (“The failure of a systemically significant clearinghouse could be 
catastrophic. It would threaten widespread, domino-like disruptions of critical money flows 
that its members and other financial institutions count on to meet their own financial 
obligations all over the world. Intervention by a government backstop—a last resort 
clearinghouse—would likely be needed to avert the collapse of a systemically significant 
clearinghouse. Due to critical but little understood reforms in Title VIII, the Federal Reserve 
can now assume this role in certain situations.”). 
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float.297 Emergency liquidity assistance need not be a bailout; if properly 
collateralized and made at a penalty interest rate, a loan to a solvent CCP could be an 
efficient way for the Federal Reserve to support the functioning of the financial 
system during a crisis.298 As Professor Lubben points out, however, “it might not 
even be possible to know at the time discount window lending happens if it 
constitutes a bailout.”299 The Federal Reserve’s use of lending programs in past 
crises illustrates how difficult it is to know whether a loan constitutes a bailout.300 
The availability of emergency lending may pose a risk as it could breed 
carelessness by both CCPs and regulators. The Federal Reserve’s past use of 
emergency lending has created expectations that the Federal Reserve would not 
hesitate to engage in emergency lending in the future.301 Manmohan Singh points out 
that the availability of emergency liquidity support “may lead to moral hazard that 
may manifest itself, for example, in CCPs not requiring full collateral from their 
existing members/clients, quite possibly with the acquiescence of regulators.”302 
Likewise, Professor Colleen Baker argues that, “the very presence of a potential 
central bank backstop for systemically significant clearinghouses—essentially the 
possibility of catastrophic liquidity insurance—creates a significant moral hazard.”303 
Regulators may view emergency lending as a backstop for subpar regulatory efforts. 
If regulators have acquiesced in or encouraged CCP under-margining, inadequate 
guaranty funds, or some other risk-management misstep, they are particularly likely 
                                                           
 297  Dodd-Frank Act § 806(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2012)). 
 298  See, e.g., Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swap Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: 
Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. 
LEGIS. 49, 79 (2011) (“[D]irect CCP access to emergency lending is more efficient and 
equitable, and thus superior, to the Federal Reserve lending indirectly through CCP 
members”). The likelihood that the provision will be used for a bailout may be increased by 
the fact that—as Baker points out—the phrasing, “unusual or exigent circumstances” is 
broader than the “unusual and exigent circumstances” used in the Federal Reserve’s 
emergency lending authority under Section 13(3) [12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2012)]. Baker, 
supra note 152, at 180 n.38. 
 299  Stephen J. Lubben, Nationalize the Clearinghouses 29 (Seton Hall Public L. Res., 
Working Paper No. 2458506, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID2458506_code108302.pdf?abstractid=2458506&mirid=1 [hereinafter Lubben, 
Nationalize the Clearinghouses]. Lubben elsewhere argues that a customized bailout, such as 
was used for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, might be crafted for a CCP in the heat of a crisis. 
Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse, supra note 295, at 28-30. 
 300  The Federal Reserve, for example, lent to American International Group in 2008, even 
though there were serious questions about whether the company was solvent. See Peirce, 
supra note 10, at 38.  
 301  See, e.g., Renee Haltom & Jeffrey M. Lacker, Should the Fed Have a Financial 
Stability Mandate? Lessons from the Fed’s First 100 Years, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF 
RICHMOND 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (“Government-lending programs often appeared to 
stabilize markets because they confirmed hopes of intervention, and so have been hailed as 
successes. But this has come at the cost of moral hazard, greater risk-taking, and greater 
instability down the road.”). 
 302  Singh, supra note 154, at 17. 
 303  Baker, supra note 152, at 184. 
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to be pressured to bail out a failing CCP. If problems emanate from products or 
participants in CCPs because of a clearing mandate, regulators will likewise face 
bailout pressure. 
Even without express Dodd-Frank language on which to rely, the regulatory 
structure that has forced risks into CCPs brings with it an implicit government 
guarantee. Ben Bernanke argued against worrying too much about a breakdown in 
clearing in the futures market because “the government, especially the central bank, 
should be thought of as part of the system.”304 He goes on to explain that: 
[T]here are actions that the government can take (and likely will take, for 
political economy reasons) to protect the clearing and settlement systems, 
should they be in danger. When the financial system is conceived broadly 
to include the government as the “insurer of last resort,” the current 
institutional setup seems satisfactorily robust to the threat of financial 
crisis.305 
Bernanke concludes that in 1987, “[t]he Federal Reserve’s gamble paid off.”306 
Although written before he became Federal Reserve Chairman and before the 
clearing mandate took hold, this view of the government, as the insurer of last resort 
for clearinghouses, seems to invite market participants to anticipate government 
intervention if a CCP runs into trouble. Messages to the contrary are important,307 
but may not overcome the market expectations grounded in the experience of the last 
crisis, the many financial company bailouts that preceded it, and the intense 
involvement of government in modern-day clearing. Professor Lubben shares 
Chairman Bernanke’s certainty that the government would step in to bail out a CCP 
“because the important, central place of clearinghouses after Dodd-Frank makes 
their failure too disruptive to be politically tolerated.”308 Professor Lubben calls for 
making the bailout explicit ex ante through the statutory establishment of an orderly-
liquidation-authority type mechanism run by the Federal Reserve.309  
The economics of clearing suggest that certain CCPs may act as de facto 
monopolies in particular asset classes310—a fact that makes a bailout more likely if 
one of these key CCPs were to fail. If only one CCP clears a product that is subject 
                                                           
 304  Bernanke, supra 172, at 145. 
 305  Id. at 145-46. 
 306  Id. at 148. 
 307  Powell, supra note 273 (advising “CCPs and their members” that they “must plan to 
stand on their own and continue to provide critical services to the financial system, without 
support from the taxpayer”). 
 308  Lubben, Nationalize the Clearinghouses, supra note 299. Elsewhere, Lubben explains 
that “the government should expressly state clearinghouses that ultimately fail will be 
nationalized, with specific consequences to investors, and an expectation of member 
participation in the recapitalization of the clearinghouse, once that becomes systemically 
viable.” Lubben, supra note 295. 
 309  Lubben, Nationalize the Clearinghouses, supra note 299, at 301. 
 310  See, e.g., Capponi & Cheng, supra note 234 (“[T]here is a large cost of entry to the 
clearing business, and clearing is currently segregated among asset classes and concentrated 
within a few clearinghouses, granting them significant market power.”). 
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to a clearing mandate,311 markets will not be able to function as usual if the CCP 
ceases to exist. Transactions in a product subject to a clearing mandate cannot 
lawfully occur unless there is a CCP that accepts that product. Consequently, the 
government will be under intense pressure to rescue and resuscitate a failing CCP.312 
An alternative would be for the government to encourage another already operational 
and healthy CCP that clears other types of products to begin clearing the products 
formerly cleared by the failing CCP. Such an expansion, however, would likely take 
considerable time as it would require the expanding CCP to analyze the risk 
associated with the new product and any new clearing members, determine how it 
will manage that risk, and gain regulatory approval to clear the product. 
A possible rejoinder to the concern about bailouts is that CCPs rarely fail. There 
have been failures, however, and today’s more complex CCPs distorted by clearing 
mandates and attendant regulation are not immune from failure. Past failures include 
the Caisse de Liquidation in 1974, the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House in 
1983, and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Clearing Corp. in 1987.313 In each case, 
the problem related to margin issues.314 Brazil’s BM&F CCP almost failed in 1999 
when there was inadequate margin after a real devaluation caused two clearing 
members to default.315 The Bank of England’s Paul Tucker described the severe 
fallout from the Hong Kong failure: 
[T]he Hong Kong Futures Exchange clearing house (and its guarantee 
corporation) failed in the wake of the global stock market crash in 1987. 
The Futures Exchange had to close. Traders faced margin calls on cash 
market equity positions but, with the futures market closed and the 
clearing house bust, they could not get margin moneys returned on 
profitable futures positions. For that and other reasons, the stock market 
closed too. Hong Kong’s main capital market shut down. Reopening the 
exchanges was no small feat. Ultimately, Hong Kong taxpayers, together 
with the clearing banks, put up the funds to underpin the Futures 
Exchange.316 
More recently, in December 2013, a Korean CCP dipped into its guaranty fund 
after one of its members—a small broker-dealer—defaulted because of a trading 
                                                           
 311  To avoid this problem and allow a CCP to fail, BlackRock has recommended that the 
clearing mandate only apply to products cleared by two or more CCPs. See BLACKROCK, 
supra note 198. 
 312  BlackRock described the dilemma that market participants will face if a CCP fails: 
“[G]iven that the CCP’s business is risk management, its failure is a failure of risk 
management of such proportion that market participants, especially those that are fiduciaries, 
are unlikely to put new risk positions on that would be cleared through a CCP attempting to 
recover, especially if there margin is at risk.” Id. 
 313  Hills et al., supra note 62, at 129-30 (providing a helpful discussion of the causes of 
each CCP failure); MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 210; see also GREGORY, supra 
note 59, at 267-70 (discussing historical CCP failures and near failures). 
 314  IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, at 18 (highlighting the role 
that failure to properly increase margin requirements played in the CCP failures). 
 315  See QUARRY ET AL., supra note 90, at 6. 
 316  Tucker, supra note 160, at 180.  
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error.317 Sixty members, including JPMorgan, absorbed more than $40 million in 
losses by replenishing the guaranty fund.318 To the displeasure of these members, the 
CCP had a default waterfall that provided for tapping the guaranty fund before the 
CCP bears any of the loss.319 Even though the default happened during a period of 
relative calm, some members required a several month grace period to make their 
payments.320 During a crisis, it is even more unlikely that members would be able to 
pay promptly. Problems at CCPs emerge quickly and come with a high price tag—
precisely the scenario on which government bailouts are built. 
III. A BETTER APPROACH TO MANAGING RISK 
To achieve greater financial stability and serve markets effectively, the current 
top-down regulatory framework for OTC derivatives needs to be replaced with a 
regulatory approach that leaves decisions about clearing and the consequences of 
those decisions in the private sector. The new structure would not include clearing 
mandates or associated trading mandates. Provisions designating CCPs systemically 
important and providing them access to Federal Reserve backstops would likewise 
not be part of the new structure. The new regulatory structure would instead allow 
market participants to choose central clearing and substitute a principles-based 
regulatory approach for the current increasingly prescriptive approach to CCP 
regulation. A comprehensive reporting regime for cleared and uncleared swaps 
would ensure that firms and their regulators have better sight into where derivatives 
exposures are than they did in the last crisis.  
A. Elimination of the Clearing Mandate 
The first step toward enhancing financial stability is to eliminate the clearing 
mandate. Admittedly, doing so would be a stark departure from one of the core 
features of Dodd-Frank’s derivatives framework. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
ensure that the regulatory framework does not become the source of a future crisis. 
To effectively eliminate the mandate, capital, and margin incentives to clear, also 
need to be eliminated. The mandate, together with other regulatory nudges to clear, 
impedes market participants’ ability to make choices. These market participants, 
                                                           
 317  Kanga Kong, Trading Error Leaves Korean Broker Scrambling, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 
2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/12/18/trading-error-leaves-korean-broker-
scrambling; Viren Vaghela, Korea Clearing Structure in Question After HanMag Trading 
Error, RISK.NET (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.risk.net/asia-risk/feature/2331225/korea-clearing-
structure-in-question-after-hanmag-trading-error; Yi Whan-woo, HanMag Debacle Hits 
Brokerages, KOREA TIMES (Dec. 17, 2013), http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/ 
2013/12/602_148108.html. 
 318  Vaghela, supra note 317. 
 319  Id.; Wetjen, supra note 273 (“The clearinghouse used a portion of its guaranty fund to 
cover the defaulter’s losses, which resulted in clearing members losing some portion of their 
default-fund contributions; the clearinghouse itself did not suffer a loss because its skin in the 
game came after the non-defaulting members’ contributions . . . . That losses occurred at all 
served as a wakeup call for firms who are members of multiple Central Counterparties (CCPs) 
around the globe.”). 
 320  Vaghela, supra note 317 (“On January 20, most members of the exchange replenished 
the default fund with KRX offering some flexibility until March as a final deadline to make 
payment.”). 
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who may be better informed than regulators and CCPs,321 are well positioned to 
make choices consistent with strong risk management and customer needs. As Paul 
McBride points out, much can be done with “voluntary, rather than compulsory 
clearing, [which enables] market participants . . . to exercise discretion in order to 
strike the optimal balance between the costs and benefits of clearing.”322 Eliminating 
the mandate would also ease concerns that a failing CCP would lock up markets 
since market participants would be able to continue trading uncleared products 
without running afoul of a clearing mandate. 
It is likely that CCPs would continue to clear many of the swaps that they 
currently clear and add new products to meet organic market demand for central 
clearing. Even before Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate was put in place, some OTC 
derivatives were being centrally cleared because of market interest in central 
clearing.323 Affording market participants the ability to choose whether to clear 
would allow them to avoid risky CCPs and exercise leverage to improve the risk-
management of poor CCPs. In contrast to the current model where, once a mandate 
is in place, CCPs have a government-granted privilege, a mandate-less model would 
give CCPs an incentive to earn customer business by managing risk well.324 
The trading mandate, which was established by Dodd-Frank as a companion of 
the clearing mandate, should likewise be eliminated. As with clearing, market 
participants will choose to trade on established platforms based on a wide variety of 
considerations that they are best positioned to balance. The swap execution facilities 
called into life by Dodd-Frank would continue to exist, if they meet organic market 
demand. 
B. Principles-Based Regulation 
The elimination of the clearing mandate would not eliminate CCPs or the need 
for regulatory oversight. Primary responsibility for designing and running CCPs 
should remain with the CCP’s owners and members. A prescriptive regulatory 
regime inappropriately shifts this responsibility to regulators by placing the full array 
of risk management decisions in their hands. CCPs therefore should be subject to a 
principles-based regulatory regime that allows CCPs broad discretion to operate 
within the principles in the manner that best suits the products they clear and the 
market participants they serve. Within this framework, they must have the room to 
                                                           
 321  Pirrong, Bill of Goods, supra note 148, at 48 (“Dealers have a strong incentive to 
develop accurate models because the models enable the dealers to quantify and manage their 
market risk more effectively, price their derivatives more accurately and earn trading profits 
as a result, and evaluate the default risk posed by customers.”). 
 322  McBride, supra note 187, at 1121-22. 
 323  Culp, supra note 29, at 103 (noting that CCPs started clearing OTC derivatives in the 
late 1990s); Randall S. Kroszner, Central Counterparty Clearing: History, Innovation, and 
Regulation, 30 ECON. PERSP. 37, 39 (2006). 
 324  The notion that clearing members do not care about CCP risk is belied by the 
widespread industry concern about uncapped exposures to CCP risk. See, e.g., Letter from 
Paul Saltzman to Jacob L. Lew, supra note 279 (remarking that The Clearing House 
Association “[c]ontinues to share the serious concerns raised by regulators regarding the need 
to address and mitigate systemic risks presented by all CCPs” and detailing concerns and 
recommendations for improved risk management). Involving clearing members in CCP risk 
management decisions is, therefore, important. 
65Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
654 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:589 
 
make swift changes to operational, technical, or risk management procedures as 
weaknesses emerge, risks are better understood, or available technology improves.  
Even in the absence of a clearing mandate, the temptation to micromanage CCPs 
for the sake of financial stability is understandable, but unwise. Increasingly 
prescriptive regulation can have the perverse effect of frustrating effective and 
adaptive CCP risk management, dulling clearing member monitoring of CCPs, and 
homogenizing CCPs so that all are subject to similar vulnerabilities. As former 
Federal Reserve Governor Randall Kroszner explained, “more intense government 
regulation of CCPs may prove counterproductive if it creates moral hazard or 
impedes the ability of CCPs to develop new approaches to risk management.”325  
To allow CCPs discretion, core principles should be broad. Without prescribing 
particular approaches, they should require CCPs to have and disclose publicly 
policies governing topics including member obligations, the complete default 
waterfall, risk management, governance, resolution and recovery procedures, and 
margin methodologies. The CPSS/IOSCO risk management principles and other 
relevant principles can inform CCPs’ compliance with the core principles.  
As described above, the manner in which the SEC and CFTC oversee CCPs 
differs; the CFTC relies more heavily on self-certification by CCPs and the SEC 
takes a more active role in rule approvals.326 Title VIII of Dodd-Frank partially 
eliminates this difference for designated CCPs by requiring that they get pre-
approval for material changes to rules, procedures, and operations.327 In addition, 
Dodd-Frank gives the Federal Reserve a consultative role with respect to such rule 
changes.328 Regulators should have regulatory authority over CCPs, but their role 
should not consist of regulatory micromanagement of CCPs. Instead, CCPs would be 
allowed to self-certify rules as compliant with the relevant core principles.329 Rule 
changes would have to be transparent and could be abrogated in the event the CCP’s 
regulator, informed by public comment, found the rule to violate core principles.  
Regulators could continue to monitor CCPs for improper practices. Professor 
Pirrong has called for regulators to be able to revise membership requirements if 
they “can show that they were adopted for anti-competitive reasons, or place an 
undue burden on competition not justified by any prudential benefit.”330 This 
principle makes sense applied more broadly to other CCP risk management and 
operational measures. 
                                                           
 325  Kroszner, supra note 323, at 37. 
 326  See supra Part I.A. 
 327  Dodd-Frank Act § 806(e) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465(e) (2012)). 
 328  Id. § 806(e)(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465(e)(4) (2012)). 
 329  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE 116 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/ 
Blueprint.pdf (“Treasury also recommends that all clearing agency and market SROs, and 
other SROs as the SEC deems appropriate, be permitted by statute to self-certify all 
rulemakings (except those involving corporate listing and market conduct standards), which 
then become effective upon filing. The SEC should retain its right to abrogate the rulemakings 
at any time.”). 
 330  Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 28-29.  
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To augment regulatory oversight of CCPs, CCPs could obtain private 
insurance331 or issue systemic risk bonds. Either of these approaches would introduce 
supplemental outside monitoring for CCPs, in addition to the monitoring provided 
by regulators and members whose guaranty fund contributions are on the line and 
who are potentially subject to additional losses through, for example, supplemental 
assessments and variation margin gains haircutting. 
C. Properly Aligned CCP Ownership and Governance 
CCPs are most likely to serve the public interest of promoting financial stability 
if their ownership and governance structures correspond to economic interests. 
Randall Kroszner has explained that, “market forces can produce private regulations 
that address the concerns about safety, soundness, and broader financial stability.”332 
As traditionally constructed, clearinghouses were a group of financial firms that 
pooled their risks, managed them jointly, and shared any losses. Risk management 
was an essential ingredient of such an arrangement.333 CCP control restrictions of the 
sort contemplated by Dodd-Frank that would prohibit such an arrangement are ill-
considered.334 As a result of demutualization, today’s CCPs tend to not to be 
member-owned; most CCPs are affiliated with an exchange.335 Clearing members, 
however, continue to be the primary loss-bearers when they fail. Consequently, as 
                                                           
 331  Some have proposed insurance to cover potential losses at the end of the default 
waterfall. See, e.g., Matthew Leising, Catastrophe Prevention Drives Pitch to Congress, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-
11/catastrophe-prevention-drives-insurance-pitch-to-clearinghouses (describing formation of 
an insurance consortium to offer insurance to clearinghouses). 
 332  Kroszner, supra note 323, at 38. 
 333  See, e.g., IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, at 16 (noting that 
a race to the risk management bottom “will be counteracted provided that users, who bear the 
risk of each other’s default, have a sufficient voice in governance and particularly if the CCP 
is user-owned”); Kroszner, supra note 323, at 38 (“The mutualization of risk creates 
incentives for all of the exchange’s members to support the imposition of risk controls that 
limit the extent to which the trading activities of any individual member expose all of [the] 
other members to losses from defaults. Moreover, because members own the clearinghouse, 
they have the capability to act on their incentives for effective CCP risk management.”). 
 334  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 726 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8323 (2012)) (“[The CFTC is 
permitted to] adopt rules which may include numerical limits on the control of, or the voting 
rights with respect to, any derivatives clearing organization that clears swaps . . . by a bank 
holding company . . . with total consolidated assets of $50,000,000,000 or more, a nonbank 
financial company . . . supervised by the Board, an affiliate of such a bank holding company 
or nonbank financial company, a swap dealer, major swap participant, or associated person of 
a swap dealer or major swap participant.”). 
 335  See, e.g., Domanski et al., supra note 163, at 63 (“In 83% of the cases, CCPs are 
directly owned or managed by the company operating the stock exchange.”); Douglas D. 
Evanoff, et al., Policymakers, Researchers, and Practitioners Discuss the Role of Central 
Counterparties, in THE ROLE OF CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 12 (2007), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/rolecentralcounterparties200707en.pdf?2973e97f82
1d65505808bd2a9662560e (noting that, “[i]n the U.S., there has been a recent movement 
away from the traditional model of mutual ownership of exchanges and their clearing and 
settlement providers, toward a for-profit, stock ownership,” which “could have a potential 
impact on the incentive structure and, possibly, the risk aversion of the organizations”). 
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others have argued, clearing members must play a role in managing CCPs and 
designing them.336 Regulations should accommodate and encourage active member 
involvement in CCP oversight. 
Although the mutual ownership CCP model is attractive for financial stability 
reasons, the for-profit model that dominates the swaps landscape can work once the 
clearing mandate is eliminated. CCPs will no longer have an essentially guaranteed 
stream of business, which will give market participants more leverage to influence 
CCP risk management practices. Members will be reluctant to use a CCP that 
exposes them to large risk. Now the only option for clearing members concerned 
about poor CCP risk management is to cease trading products subject to clearing 
mandates. 
The suggestion that members, whose money is on the line in the default fund, 
must play a central role in risk management, runs directly counter to the 
recommendations of others who worry about the undue control that dealers exercise 
in CCPs.337 These commentators worry that, if permitted, large dealers will limit 
entry to CCPs and prevent them from accepting products for clearing in order to 
keep products in the more profitable bilateral market.338 They call for ownership and 
governance restrictions of the sort permitted by Dodd-Frank and proposed by the 
SEC and CFTC.339 They want to replace the voices of clearing members with those 
of public interest directors in risk management and other key committees.340 
Concerns about dealer control of the swaps market are not baseless, but risk 
                                                           
 336  See, e.g., Hills et al., supra note 62, at 130 (noting that if risk monitoring incentives are 
to be effective, “providers of the central counterparty’s guarantee fund or other capital should 
also be its owners, or at least . . . management should be accountable to them in some way”); 
Kroszner, supra note 323, at 39 (“[G]overnance arrangements must provide those with ‘skin 
in the game’ with substantial influence over the CCP’s risk controls.”); Pirrong, Economics of 
Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 26 (arguing that “[t]hose who bear the counterparty risks 
assumed by a CCP should have the power to make decisions that affect the riskiness of the 
CCP, and the distribution of that risk”); Hal Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the 
United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 701 (2010) (arguing against 
ownership and control restrictions that “[w]ould limit the ability of swap dealers and major 
swap participants, who are the parties with the greatest expertise in risk management, to 
exercise influence over the policies and operations of a clearinghouse”). 
 337  See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 52, at 245 (arguing for strong limits on the economic 
interests of swap dealers in CCPs).  
 338  See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 266, at 222-25 (arguing that large swap dealers have 
incentives to limit CCP membership and product eligibility). 
 339  See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 52, at 245 (“[T]he CFTC should strengthen its 
proposed governance standards for DCOs in order to safeguard swap users’ access to clearing 
against the possibility that the CFTC’s participant eligibility requirements fail to increase 
DCO membership.”) (footnote omitted); Johnson, supra note 258, at 239-40 (arguing for 
board monitor or observer to provide a link between CCP boards and regulators). 
 340  See, e.g., TURBEVILLE, supra note 79, at 13 (“At a minimum, the public’s interest 
should be represented by membership on the risk committees of major clearinghouses. 
Regulatory representation, or representation by other public interest organization, would 
legitimize the process . . . .”); DOJ Comment Letter, supra note 264, at 7 (calling for one 
hundred percent independent directors on nominating committees and majority independent 
risk management and executive committees). 
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management will suffer if the people who bear the risks are not also able to 
determine how best to manage them. Regulatory principles should encourage the 
involvement of knowledgeable experts in CCP management and oversight.  
Prohibitions against anticompetitive activity modeled on existing statutory 
prohibitions should suffice to prevent CCPs from being used for improper 
competitive purposes. For example, DCOs are prohibited from “adopt[ing] any rule 
or tak[ing] any action that results in any unreasonable restraint of trade; or 
impos[ing] any material anticompetitive burden . . . [u]nless necessary or appropriate 
to achieve the purposes of this chapter.”341 That language could be modified to 
enable regulators to abrogate CCP rules or other actions upon demonstrating that the 
action was being undertaken for anticompetitive reasons rather than bolstering the 
soundness of the CCP.342 The task of identifying improper anticompetitive behavior 
is best left to the functional regulators, rather than to the realm of antitrust law.343 
D. End Implicit and Explicit Promises of Bailouts 
For the sake of financial stability, regulatory changes should be made to end 
bailout expectations. As Kroszner explains, “promises[s] of government financial 
support in the event of a risk-management failure” can “eviscerate[] . . . private-
market discipline, which has served private and public interests in the stability of 
CCP arrangements so well for so long.”344 The government should eliminate explicit 
and implicit government guarantees on CCPs.  
Central to eliminating government guarantees is ending the FSOC’s power to 
designate systemically important financial market utilities under Title VIII of Dodd-
Frank. The designation carries with it an implicit message that the government will 
not let designated entities fail. It also affords designated CCPs access to Federal 
Reserve accounts and services, which will enable the Federal Reserve to subtly prop 
up a failing CCP in a future crisis. All of these Title VIII provisions should be 
                                                           
 341  7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(N)(2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)(3)(I)((2013) (“The rules 
of the clearing agency do not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate 
in furtherance of the purposes of this title.”). 
 342  As noted earlier, Pirrong called for something similar with respect to membership 
measures. Pirrong, Economics of Central Clearing, supra note 203, at 28-29 (calling for 
regulators to be able to revise membership requirements if the regulators “can show that they 
were adopted for anti-competitive reasons, or place an undue burden on competition not 
justified by any prudential benefit”). 
 343  The Supreme Court’s reasoning for not allowing an antitrust suit to proceed in Credit 
Suisse v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007), which related to initial public offering underwriter 
syndicates, seems applicable here:   
[T]he difficulty of drawing a complex, sinuous line separating securities-permitted 
from securities-forbidden conduct, the need for securities-related expertise to draw 
that line, the likelihood that litigating parties will depend upon the same evidence yet 
expect courts to draw different inferences from it, and the serious risk that antitrust 
courts will produce inconsistent results that, in turn, will overly deter syndicate 
practices important in the marketing of new issues. 
Id. at 285. 
 344  Kroszner, supra note 323, at 40. 
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eliminated. The provision of emergency liquidity to solvent CCP members can 
address temporary liquidity problems at a CCP. 
The elimination of the clearing mandate also would help to send the message that 
the government is not a CCP guarantor. As long as the government requires market 
participants to use CCPs, market participants will anticipate a government bailout. 
Removing the mandate and other incentives to clear would undercut bailout 
expectations.  
Finally, regulators should encourage private sector efforts involving CCPs and 
their members to define CCPs’ default waterfalls clearly, realistically explore tail 
risks, and plan for recapitalization and resolution in the event of failure due to 
defaults or non-default problems (for example, operational issues).345 At the core of 
all of these is a need to understand as well as possible what a CCP’s worst-case 
exposures would be, although there will always be some measure of uncertainty 
around tail risk. Deciding how much of these potential exposures should be 
prefunded through initial margin and guaranty fund contributions is the next step. To 
the extent that some of the exposure remains unfunded, the CCP must map out a plan 
for covering it through member assessments, variation margin gains haircuts, or tear-
ups. As scholar David Elliott points out, most CCPs have recognized that retaining 
unlimited authority to call for member cash contributions is not realistic because 
members might not pay in a timely fashion and regulatory constraints prevent 
clearing members from taking on uncapped risks.346 Although current conversations 
about these issues have been spurred by the increase in clearing brought about by the 
clearing mandate, they are valuable in the absence of a mandate. Credible plans by 
CCPs to deal with failures in risk management or operational systems are a critical 
part of eliminating implicit expectations of government bailouts. 
E. Regulatory Reporting Requirements 
One of the concerns during the last crisis was that regulators did not have a good 
picture of the OTC derivatives market. Even market participants did not have a good 
view of their own exposures because of trade backlogs.347 CCPs provide a discipline 
                                                           
 345  For thoughtful discussions of these issues, see, for example, COMM. ON PAYMENTS & 
MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES & BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, RECOVERY OF FINANCIAL 
MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES (2014), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d121.pdf (comments on the 
report are available at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/comments/d109/overview.htm); Darrell 
Duffie, Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties (Stan. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working 
Paper No. 3256, 2014), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-
auth/382301; ISDA, CCP LOSS ALLOCATION AT THE END OF THE WATERFALL (2013); 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., What is the Resolution Plan for CCPs?, PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 2014); 
LCH.CLEARNET, CCP RISK MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY & RESOLUTION (2014), 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762448/316246_white_paper_05.12.14_v6.pd
f/a3dd194e-68e1-4302-ba63-fc1e668ea7d5. 
 346  Elliott, supra note 186. Elliott calls for pro rata haircuts on variation margin. Id. at 7. 
Alternatively, Elliott suggests that initial margin could be subject to haircutting or that the 
CCP could simply tear up contracts in order to return itself to a matched book. Id. at 8-9. 
 347  See, e.g., POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET, supra note 76, at 2 (“In 
2005, the exponential growth of the credit derivatives market had outpaced the capabilities of 
dealers’ processing systems, leading to large backlogs of unconfirmed trades. These 
unconfirmed trades had potentially uncertain legal statuses, often for lengthy periods of time, 
and limited the ability of dealers to accurately determine their counterparty exposures . . . .”). 
70https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/8
2016] CLEARING THE WAY FOR FAILURE 659 
 
that prevents the buildup of such backlogs,348 but a reporting regime can do the same 
thing. A replacement regulatory regime should provide regulators the information 
they need to monitor the derivatives markets. In doing this, it will also ensure that 
market participants are keeping track of their exposures to CCPs and other 
counterparties.  
Elements of Dodd-Frank’s reporting regime achieve this objective. Under Dodd-
Frank, market participants report swap transactions to a swap data repository (SDR) 
or to the SEC or CFTC.349 The SDR collects and confirms trade details and stores 
trade data for regulators to access. SDRs350 could be retained for these purposes. 
Transactions should be reported as soon as reasonably possible after they are entered 
into to avoid the build-up of backlogs of unconfirmed transactions and information 
should be kept current during and for some time after the swap contract’s life. Dodd-
Frank specifies which entities possess the reporting obligation, but under a new 
framework, this determination could be part of contractual negotiations. Given the 
institutional nature of swaps markets, it seems unnecessary for regulators to 
prescribe public reporting of swap transaction data.  
Even if regulators have timely and comprehensive access to information about 
the OTC derivatives markets, policymakers should not assume that regulators will 
identify and preemptively solve emerging problems in those markets.351 As with 
other areas, markets are more agile at gathering, analyzing, and reacting to 
information than regulators are, particularly if market participants bear the 
consequences of their own decisions. The recognition of regulators’ limits underlies 
a regulatory framework that leaves risk management decisions and consequences 
with market participants. 
                                                           
 348  See, e.g., Ledrut & Upper, supra note 57, at 92 (“High access standards by CCPs can 
serve as a catalyst for improvements in back office processes.”). 
 349  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 727 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a(13)(G) (2012)) (“Each swap 
(whether cleared or uncleared) shall be reported to a registered swap data repository.”); id. § 
729 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6o-1(a)(1) (2012)) (allowing uncleared swaps to be reported to the 
CFTC) (Parallel provisions exist for security-based swaps.) 
 350  Swap data repositories are defined in Dodd-Frank to mean “any person that collects and 
maintains information or records with respect to transactions or positions in, or the terms and 
conditions of, swaps entered into by third parties for the purpose of providing a centralized 
recordkeeping facility for swaps.” Dodd-Frank Act § 721 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a (48) 
(2012)). Entities that meet this definition must register with the CFTC. Id. § 728 (codified at 7 
U.S.C. § 21 (2012)). SDRs should be able to choose whether to register, which would entitle 
them to serve as repositories to which swap transactions could be reported to meet regulatory 
requirements. Other SDRs might choose to serve non-regulatory audiences without 
registering. 
 351  See, e.g., Friedrich August von Hayek, Prize Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel: 
The Pretence of Knowledge (Dec. 11, 1974), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ 
economic-sciences/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html (“The recognition of the insuperable 
limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of society a lesson of humility which 
should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men’s fatal striving to control society - a 
striving which makes him not only a tyrant over his fellows, but which may well make him 
the destroyer of a civilization which no brain has designed but which has grown from the free 
efforts of millions of individuals.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the exuberant wake of Dodd-Frank, few focused on the risks associated with 
CCPs. Now that some time has passed, regulators and other proponents of central 
clearing readily acknowledge that CCPs present difficulties and dangers. 
Nevertheless, advocates of central clearing have not paid adequate attention to the 
potential harmful consequences of the clearing mandate and the related regulatory 
structure.  
The Dodd-Frank framework has given rise to a new set of risks by compromising 
the effectiveness of clearinghouse risk management, while simultaneously 
encouraging CCPs to embrace new risks. Regulators perceive—likely correctly—
that they will be judged in part by how much of the OTC derivatives market is 
cleared. This perception colors their regulatory oversight and distracts them from 
focusing on risk. Prescriptive regulation displaces or distorts CCPs’ own risk 
management initiatives. CCPs’ risk management focus is further dulled by calls to 
dampen the influence of clearing members and incorporate independent decision-
makers in their corporate boards. The preference given to cleared instruments has a 
secondary effect of making it more difficult for parties to manage risk outside CCPs 
and less likely to monitor one another. Moreover, as CCPs grow and change in 
response to government policy, expectations of a bailout deepen. 
Rather than continuing down this road, policymakers should eliminate clearing 
mandates, the attendant prescriptive regulatory regime for CCPs, systemic 
designations of CCPs, and special Federal Reserve privileges for CCPs. A 
replacement regulatory framework should consist of a broad set of principles for 
CCPs, a reporting framework for cleared and uncleared swaps, a governance 
framework for CCPs that includes market participants whose money is on the line, 
and a clear delineation of default waterfalls and CCP recovery plans. A return to 
private ordering in the OTC derivatives space would diminish bailout expectations 
and allow market participants to benefit from central clearing where it makes sense, 
continue to use uncleared swaps where they best manage risk, monitor and manage 
both CCP and non-CCP risk effectively. 
Political realities domestically and the shared international commitment to 
mandatory clearing may stand in the way of the proposed return to private ordering. 
If clearing mandates remain in place, policymakers can benefit from considering the 
concerns raised in this article about the risks associated with mandatory clearing and 
the associated regulatory structure. Regulators need to be keenly aware of the 
deleterious effect poor regulatory requirements can have on CCPs’ risk management. 
Supervisors should apply clearing mandates carefully and only after a full 
consideration of the risks informed by adequate data. Policymakers should afford 
CCPs and their participants the regulatory flexibility necessary to manage risk 
effectively and should monitor CCPs closely. Regulators and market participants 
should continue to work together to understand how CCPs would perform under 
stressed scenarios and how losses from the default of one or more clearing members 
would be allocated. Relationships among CCP supervisors have been tense in recent 
years, but cooperation is critical. Regardless of whether the clearing mandate 
remains in place, CCPs will continue to play an important role in the financial 
system. Accordingly, efforts by regulators, market participants, and academics to 
better understand, manage, and monitor CCP risk, are well worth the commitment of 
resources, time, and attention. 
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